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- I'd like to thank you for joining us

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for this ILW Contemporary Military Forum

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entitled Future Disruptive Threats.

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As your professional association,

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ASA's Institute of Land Warfare

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is proud to provide forums
like this throughout the year

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to broaden the knowledge
base of Army professionals

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and those who support our Army.

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This is one of 10 professional forums

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that we'll be conducting
over the next three days.

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AUSA seeks to amplify
the US Army's narrative

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to audiences inside the Army

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and to help further the
association's mission

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to be the voice for the Army
and support for the soldier.

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Of course, we cannot do this alone.

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AUSA relies on its members
to help tell the Army's story

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and to support the soldiers
and their families.

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A strong membership base
is vitally important

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for advocacy efforts with
Congress and the American people.

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For those of you Army professionals

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who are not yet members of
your professional association,

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we encourage you to join AUSA

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by visiting the membership booth,

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booth 307 in exhibit hall A,

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or sign up online at AUSA.org/membership.

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If you're already a member of AUSA,

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thank you very much for staying with us.

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And now I'd like to turn the floor over

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to Lieutenant General Scott Berrier,

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Headquarters DA G2.

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Thank you.

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(applause)

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- Dan, thank you, and thanks to AUSA

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for your continued support for our Army.

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Ladies and gentlemen,

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good afternoon and welcome to today's

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contemporary military forum number two,

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Future Disruptive Threats.

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It is my honor to moderate
this distinguished panel

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of the nation's foremost
intelligence leaders

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who collectively represent

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the most formidable intelligence
center prize in the world.

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Today, they are here to touch
upon a very timely topic,

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the future of disruptive
threats facing our Army,

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whether it be from nation state powers

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like Russia and China,

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or from regional threats
like Iran and North Korea.

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America expects and relies upon the Army

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to adapt and contend
with these challenges.

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Today's panel discussion

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will address an array of
the most pressing threats

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from each of these antagonists,

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as well as challenges in the
cyber and information domains.

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We'll probably also
touch on malign influence

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and threats in the gray zone.

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These are all timely and
relevant topics of concern,

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so I'm certain this will be a great event.

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Before I continue any further

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I'd like to thank each
one of our panelists

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who have given up their own time,

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on a Monday holiday no less,
and graciously joined us

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because of their genuine
interest in our nation's security

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and the concern for
the future of our Army.

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So on behalf of our host,

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the Association of the United States Army

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and the Chief of Staff of
the United States Army,

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General Mark Milley,

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let me thank all of you
for attending today.

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I also want to acknowledge

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and thank the entire AUSA
team of professionals

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for once again putting together
a fantastic annual meeting

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highlighting that the Army is indeed

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the strength of our nation.

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I anticipate a spirited
panel discussion today,

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and even better question
and answer session,

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and hope that each of you will
learn from the conversation.

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So let me introduce our superb panelists.

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In your handouts you have
the detailed biographies

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of each of our five panelists.

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They are the leaders of our
nation's intelligence agencies,

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and in the interest of
time I won't repeat them,

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but I encourage you all to read them.

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First, let me welcome
the honorable Sue Gordon,

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our Principle Deputy Director
of National Intelligence

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and senior advisor to the DNI,
round of applause, please.

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(applause)

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Next, the commender US Cyber com,

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Director of National Security Agency

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and chief of the Central Security Service,

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General Paul Nakasone.

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(applause)

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Next, the Deputy

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to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence,

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the honorable Kari Bingen.

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(applause)

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Next, the director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency,

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Lieutenant General Bob AShley.

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(applause)

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And finally,

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the director of the National
Geo space Intelligence Agency,

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Director Robert Cardillo.

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(applause)

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During the course of
the panelist's remarks,

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members of the audience
will have the opportunity

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to jot down questions for our panelists

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on three by five cards.

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These will be collected by our staff,

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and selected questions
will be posed to our guests

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at the conclusion of all remarks.

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Honorable Gordon, we'll
begin with you, ma'am.

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- Thanks, Scotty.

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Good afternoon, and thank
you for the opportunity

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to sub for Director Coats.

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As an Army veteran, I
know he wanted to be here,

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but I confess that I'm
happy to take his place

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and to bask in the
wisdom of my colleagues,

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and to be in your presence.

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I'm going to keep my remarks brief

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because I'm well aware
that I'm batting lead off

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for a variable murderer's row of

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leaders that will follow me,
but I also want to make sure

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we have time for your questions.

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So here's what I'm gonna
do. I'm gonna kick off

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with a strategic view of
the threats that we face.

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I wanna talk about the importance

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of understanding our adversary's intent,

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not just their capabilities,
and then I'll talk about

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the promise and the challenge
of data in this world.

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The threats we face are
well known and longstanding.

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They include Russia, China,
Iran, North Korea, terrorism,

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cyber, and I would include transnational,

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organized crime in this.

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But what makes this moment so complex,

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so dynamic, is the nature of these threats

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is evolving at a remarkable pace.

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In my view, this stems from two factors.

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One, digital interconnectedness
and ubiquitous technology

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that are both disruptive and
advantageous at the same time,

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and they are fundamentally
challenging the capability,

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the speed, the reach,

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and even the aspiration
of our adversaries.

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And they're making the
threat increasingly diffuse,

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diverse, and disruptive.

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Diffuse because the
barrier to entry is so low.

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Diverse because the addition of technology

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to what had been a very
classic military capabilities

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is changing the very nature,

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and disruptive because,
as you add technology,

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with the digital interconnectedness,

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you have the ability to attack
not only what is evident,

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but the infrastructure that supports it.

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These threats are changing
the nature of warfare,

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and our adversaries employ a
range of non-kinetic options

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to advance their national interest.

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So let's take a quick
romp around the world,

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and let's see of I can't
summarize the threats.

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Russia is fascinating because,

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in 1980 when I started in this game,

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it was the Soviet Union and
it was massively capable,

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but it was pretty much of a monolith.

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It is no longer.

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It is investing in advanced technologies

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at a remarkable rate,

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it is pressing its reach geographically,

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whether that is into the arctic,

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into the Middle East,
or throughout the globe,

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and it is increasingly brazen

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in its weaponization of cyber tools,

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both in technical tacts and
in influence operations.

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And, as it expands outside its borders,

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it is gaining experience and
operations that will test us

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in different ways than it has before.

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China is also investing
in advanced weaponry,

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but its economic expansionism globally

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that perhaps presents the
most daunting challenge.

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Beijing is employing
a whole of government,

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and probably a whole of country approach

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in its pursuit of economic dominance,

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and it's purposeful in its use
of technological capability

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to achieve this aim.

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In addition to

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the quality of what it's doing,

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I would opine

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that the quantity presents
its own aspect of quality

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in terms of just the numbers
that it can bring to bare.

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Iran's activities in the Middle
East have filled the space

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left by both our successes and
our failures in the region.

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As we have pushed ISIS out
of its comfortable geography,

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Iran has filled the space

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and it is an incredibly malign presence

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not to be confused with
a stabilizing force.

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In its willingness to be a
state sponsor of terrorism

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and to provide weapons to many forces

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presents a fascinating challenge

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from the support of militant Shea groups

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or the Houthis in Yemen.

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And what a moment of
dynamism with North Korea.

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We're, for once, confronted
with the optimism

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of the possibility of
negotiations on denuclearization,

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and the fact that we haven't
seen testing over the past year

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a positive, with the reality

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of the capability that they have possessed

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and what will happen there.

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Terrorism remains a serious threat,

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but it is different in
nature than it was in 9/11.

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It is more diffuse, harder to
come by, and still dangerous.

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Then I'm going to add
transnational organized crime.

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The opioid crisis, let
me put this in context.

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Last year alone, 72,000
Americans died of drug overdoses.

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That's the equivalent of
a 767 crashing every day.

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And if we don't think this poses a threat

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to national security,
we're just not thinking.

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And it's not just the nation states,

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it's the use of cyber and outer space,

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two domains that have the
ability to extend reach

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and capability in ways that
have been our unique domain,

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and now our adversaries
are moving into them.

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Now, my colleagues I'm sure
will talk in greater depth

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on these threats, and you can
ask me, but I will tell you

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that each one of these threats

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tests us to be nimble,

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to be resilient, and to be responsive

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in ways that we may have
not needed to in the past.

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Understanding intent.

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So in the intelligence community,

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our business is to know
the true CB on the horizon

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and allow decision making
before events dictate,

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and for my whole career we
have provided intelligence

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on the capabilities that I just mentioned.

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I will tell you when we're at our best,

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it's when we understand the intent.

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The why an adversary is doing something,

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and how they might employ it.

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Intent is what allows you to
move left out of an attack,

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and it is intent that we
must continue to press,

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especially in a data rich world

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where you have a lot of whats

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but you need to know a lot of whys.

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And we will be pressed to
offer that understanding,

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not just to the intelligence community,

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not just to the policy makers,
not just to our war fighters,

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but increasingly to the private sector,

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because the threat surfaces in the nation

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extend beyond the bounds

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of the government and our private sector

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needs to be a participant

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in how they prepare themselves against us.

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And finally, let me talk about data,

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talk anybody something
with a bane and boon.

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If you're in my business,

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what is happening with these technologies

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and the digital connectiveness
is an abundance of data

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that provides the possibility for answer

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and threatens to overwhelm
us at the same time.

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We are going to have to get
better and better and better

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at using machines as partners

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if we are going to be able
to master this domain,

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have enough clarity inside
on what is happening,

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and be able to respond.

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00:12:53,760 --> 00:12:55,853
And the person that dominates data,

261
00:12:57,200 --> 00:12:59,600
who can understand it and
command it for its use

262
00:12:59,610 --> 00:13:01,573
a little sooner, a little better,

263
00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:03,750
is the one that is gonna carry the day.

264
00:13:03,840 --> 00:13:08,030
So, rampant threats,
intelligence community

265
00:13:08,030 --> 00:13:09,740
pressing on the notion of intent

266
00:13:09,740 --> 00:13:13,283
so you have the best advantage
to know how you must respond,

267
00:13:13,830 --> 00:13:17,350
and not just respond in kind,
but to respond across domains

268
00:13:17,620 --> 00:13:20,070
and the importance of
being able to command data.

269
00:13:20,580 --> 00:13:22,780
I think I'll turn it over
to my panel from there.

270
00:13:22,780 --> 00:13:23,613
Thank you.

271
00:13:23,780 --> 00:13:24,770
- [Scotty] Honorable Gordon, thank you,

272
00:13:24,770 --> 00:13:26,840
and for the audience, if any of this

273
00:13:26,840 --> 00:13:28,470
has spurred you on for a question,

274
00:13:28,470 --> 00:13:30,420
please get it on a three by five card

275
00:13:30,420 --> 00:13:32,670
and get it to Mr. Clark
up here in the front.

276
00:13:32,720 --> 00:13:33,650
General Nakasone.

277
00:13:33,650 --> 00:13:34,920
- Thanks, Scotty, I appreciate it.

278
00:13:34,920 --> 00:13:36,740
Director Gordon and fellow panel members,

279
00:13:36,740 --> 00:13:39,160
thank you so much for
appearing today with me.

280
00:13:39,160 --> 00:13:41,170
I think this is far superior

281
00:13:41,170 --> 00:13:44,453
to meeting in a meeting
someplace, someplace in DC,

282
00:13:44,520 --> 00:13:45,470
but rather talk about

283
00:13:45,470 --> 00:13:48,823
what we obviously have some
very very strong passions about.

284
00:13:48,990 --> 00:13:50,580
I'd like to set context today

285
00:13:50,580 --> 00:13:52,533
with the strategic environment,

286
00:13:52,660 --> 00:13:54,100
talk a very little bit about threats.

287
00:13:54,100 --> 00:13:56,633
I think Director Gordon
really laid that out well,

288
00:13:56,790 --> 00:13:58,980
but didn't get into this idea
of persistent engagement,

289
00:13:58,980 --> 00:14:01,203
persistent presence,
persistent innovation,

290
00:14:01,570 --> 00:14:03,130
and then conclude, talk about it.

291
00:14:03,130 --> 00:14:04,830
What does this really mean to our Army?

292
00:14:04,830 --> 00:14:06,190
As we meet here today,

293
00:14:06,190 --> 00:14:09,973
the first of three days for
our annual AUSA convention,

294
00:14:10,070 --> 00:14:12,170
I think it's important
that we bring this back

295
00:14:12,170 --> 00:14:14,880
to the center of what does this entail

296
00:14:14,880 --> 00:14:16,943
for the future of our United States Army.

297
00:14:18,040 --> 00:14:21,423
So let me set the stage here
in terms of what we see today.

298
00:14:21,600 --> 00:14:23,483
Often, I begin with this idea.

299
00:14:23,870 --> 00:14:28,180
For 17 years, our nation
has done a magnificent job

300
00:14:28,363 --> 00:14:31,203
at pursuing violent
extremist organizations.

301
00:14:31,900 --> 00:14:33,313
No one has done it better.

302
00:14:33,470 --> 00:14:37,333
Collection, analysis, dissemination,

303
00:14:37,800 --> 00:14:39,513
working with the finishing force.

304
00:14:39,640 --> 00:14:42,103
Think of where we've come over 17 years.

305
00:14:43,160 --> 00:14:44,570
But as we think to the future,

306
00:14:44,570 --> 00:14:45,500
and as I would offer,

307
00:14:45,500 --> 00:14:48,003
the national security
strategy has offered,

308
00:14:48,570 --> 00:14:51,040
they talk about this
idea of our adversaries

309
00:14:51,040 --> 00:14:54,030
being able to operate below the threshold

310
00:14:54,030 --> 00:14:55,283
of military conflict.

311
00:14:56,060 --> 00:14:59,060
This idea that we are gonna be
challenged within our nation,

312
00:14:59,150 --> 00:15:01,750
that our allies, our partners
will all be challenged

313
00:15:01,970 --> 00:15:06,440
by adversaries who are
able to cloak deniability

314
00:15:06,440 --> 00:15:08,563
around their intentions and their actions.

315
00:15:09,320 --> 00:15:11,870
And I offer one quite from the
National Security Strategy.

316
00:15:11,870 --> 00:15:13,860
It says, today's cyberspace

317
00:15:13,870 --> 00:15:15,440
offers state and non state actors

318
00:15:15,440 --> 00:15:18,950
the ability to wage campaigns
against American political,

319
00:15:18,950 --> 00:15:20,550
economic, and security interests

320
00:15:21,410 --> 00:15:23,853
without ever physically
crossing our borders.

321
00:15:24,750 --> 00:15:26,740
And then we think about the
National Defense Strategy, which

322
00:15:26,740 --> 00:15:29,993
has clearly laid out this idea
of great power competition.

323
00:15:30,720 --> 00:15:31,743
It's reemerged.

324
00:15:31,770 --> 00:15:33,570
It's interesting for many of us who,

325
00:15:33,700 --> 00:15:35,680
well, at this panel,
entered government service

326
00:15:35,680 --> 00:15:39,793
during the 40th President's tenure.

327
00:15:40,158 --> 00:15:42,590
We would offer that we're coming back

328
00:15:42,590 --> 00:15:44,690
to see this great power competition again.

329
00:15:45,090 --> 00:15:47,330
And it's important that
we realize that, because,

330
00:15:47,330 --> 00:15:49,130
for our entire intelligence community,

331
00:15:49,130 --> 00:15:51,690
it has different strengths
and different challenges,

332
00:15:51,690 --> 00:15:54,910
different opportunities
that it offers to all of us.

333
00:15:54,910 --> 00:15:57,410
But clearly for us, as we
start thinking about it,

334
00:15:58,020 --> 00:15:59,720
for us, we are in a period

335
00:15:59,720 --> 00:16:04,720
where our adversaries are
looking to really take us on

336
00:16:04,820 --> 00:16:07,063
below that level of armed conflict,

337
00:16:07,570 --> 00:16:10,893
to be able to steal our
intellectual property,

338
00:16:11,360 --> 00:16:12,250
to be able to leverage

339
00:16:12,250 --> 00:16:14,140
our personally identifiable information,

340
00:16:14,140 --> 00:16:16,960
to be able to so distrust
within our society

341
00:16:16,960 --> 00:16:19,490
and to be able to attempt
to disrupt our elections.

342
00:16:19,490 --> 00:16:22,460
This is what great power
competition looks like today

343
00:16:22,870 --> 00:16:25,753
and it's what we will look
at as we look to the future.

344
00:16:28,160 --> 00:16:30,700
As we think about the
threats, the threats to us

345
00:16:30,700 --> 00:16:32,560
as we look at cyberspace have well moved

346
00:16:32,560 --> 00:16:35,653
on exploitation and
disruption, even destruction.

347
00:16:35,740 --> 00:16:37,890
Think about where we
were just 10 years ago

348
00:16:38,000 --> 00:16:40,870
in terms of being concerned
about our adversaries

349
00:16:40,870 --> 00:16:42,873
spying us in cyberspace,

350
00:16:43,160 --> 00:16:44,530
and that moved onto this idea

351
00:16:44,530 --> 00:16:47,570
of our adversaries being able
to conduct disruptive attacks

352
00:16:47,570 --> 00:16:48,860
like denial of service attacks

353
00:16:48,860 --> 00:16:50,560
against our financial institution,

354
00:16:50,640 --> 00:16:53,380
or even disruptive and destructive attacks

355
00:16:53,610 --> 00:16:56,210
such as we've seen conducted
by both the Iranians

356
00:16:56,210 --> 00:16:58,060
and North Koreans against our nation.

357
00:16:59,050 --> 00:17:00,950
It's moved into this idea of corrosion

358
00:17:00,950 --> 00:17:02,640
and this idea of corrosive effects

359
00:17:02,640 --> 00:17:04,680
that adversaries can take against us.

360
00:17:04,680 --> 00:17:05,513
Whether or not

361
00:17:05,513 --> 00:17:07,540
that's the theft of our
intellectual property,

362
00:17:07,550 --> 00:17:10,430
whether or not it's threats to
our critical infrastructure,

363
00:17:10,430 --> 00:17:12,670
whether or not it's malign
influence operations,

364
00:17:12,670 --> 00:17:13,900
this is the corrosive piece

365
00:17:13,900 --> 00:17:16,260
that we've seen now
move from exploitation,

366
00:17:16,260 --> 00:17:18,943
disruption, destruction,
and now to corrosion.

367
00:17:19,838 --> 00:17:21,150
It's interesting that states

368
00:17:21,150 --> 00:17:23,220
and their surrogates
routinely target governments,

369
00:17:23,220 --> 00:17:25,670
corporations, political
parties, and individuals,

370
00:17:25,720 --> 00:17:27,600
stealing the data and
intellectual property,

371
00:17:27,600 --> 00:17:29,750
gaining insights and
competitive advantage,

372
00:17:29,790 --> 00:17:32,973
eroding bonds of trust in and
between Western democracies.

373
00:17:34,130 --> 00:17:35,060
Meanwhile, it's interesting,

374
00:17:35,060 --> 00:17:36,903
and Director Gordon touched on this,

375
00:17:37,070 --> 00:17:38,920
this idea of the cyber ecospheres

376
00:17:38,920 --> 00:17:41,653
also continue to evolve and expand.

377
00:17:41,720 --> 00:17:43,380
It's creating new opportunities for us,

378
00:17:43,380 --> 00:17:45,083
but also certainly new challenges.

379
00:17:45,370 --> 00:17:47,470
Think about it, fifth generation wireless,

380
00:17:47,470 --> 00:17:48,853
18 months out.

381
00:17:50,010 --> 00:17:53,490
Many people remember
first generation wireless,

382
00:17:53,490 --> 00:17:55,823
to include myself, when it was analog.

383
00:17:56,520 --> 00:17:57,563
Cloaked is digital.

384
00:17:58,280 --> 00:17:59,930
But we're moving on very rapidly

385
00:17:59,930 --> 00:18:03,373
to this idea of massive
increases in data collection.

386
00:18:04,670 --> 00:18:06,700
The opportunities and challenges
of storage of that data,

387
00:18:06,700 --> 00:18:07,870
cloud computing, machine learning,

388
00:18:07,870 --> 00:18:11,363
artificial intelligence, quantum
research and development.

389
00:18:12,810 --> 00:18:15,280
These are all in fields that
bring us great opportunities

390
00:18:15,280 --> 00:18:17,070
throughout our intelligence community

391
00:18:17,290 --> 00:18:19,440
in areas that work on
very very hard today.

392
00:18:19,850 --> 00:18:21,850
It's also areas that we must be first in

393
00:18:22,500 --> 00:18:24,000
and can't afford to be second.

394
00:18:25,330 --> 00:18:27,980
We're adjusting to this new environment

395
00:18:27,980 --> 00:18:30,030
by embracing a strategy
of persistent engagement

396
00:18:30,030 --> 00:18:31,030
against our threats,

397
00:18:31,460 --> 00:18:33,663
continuous action to enable our partners,

398
00:18:33,870 --> 00:18:35,260
and to act against these threats.

399
00:18:35,260 --> 00:18:37,433
Let me talk about persistent engagement.

400
00:18:38,205 --> 00:18:41,750
We originally conceived of
cyberspace probably a decade ago

401
00:18:41,750 --> 00:18:44,420
as a medium for intelligence collection,

402
00:18:44,420 --> 00:18:45,690
and it was an avenue, as we thought,

403
00:18:45,690 --> 00:18:47,453
for terrorist attacks against us.

404
00:18:48,280 --> 00:18:50,830
We invested heavily in the
defense of our networks,

405
00:18:51,540 --> 00:18:53,250
we started to think a little bit more

406
00:18:53,250 --> 00:18:54,660
about defense of our weapon systems,

407
00:18:54,660 --> 00:18:56,363
and even defense of our data.

408
00:18:57,840 --> 00:18:59,100
But in terms of cyberspace,

409
00:18:59,100 --> 00:19:01,103
we were also a very reactionary force.

410
00:19:02,240 --> 00:19:05,940
One prepared to act, but one
not in continuous engagement

411
00:19:06,270 --> 00:19:08,483
with adversaries outside
of our own systems.

412
00:19:11,990 --> 00:19:13,840
We know today that our adversaries

413
00:19:13,840 --> 00:19:16,930
have taken on a continuous
operations, probes, and raids

414
00:19:16,930 --> 00:19:18,960
to exploit both our private sector

415
00:19:18,960 --> 00:19:20,260
and our government sector,

416
00:19:20,470 --> 00:19:22,530
again, either to steal
intellectual property

417
00:19:22,530 --> 00:19:24,630
or position themselves for future attacks.

418
00:19:25,361 --> 00:19:27,440
As many of you know,
our government systems

419
00:19:27,440 --> 00:19:29,803
are continuously
attempting to be exploited.

420
00:19:30,460 --> 00:19:32,210
US Cyber Command and the
National Security Agency

421
00:19:32,210 --> 00:19:34,806
monitor threats 24 hours
a day, seven days a week,

422
00:19:34,806 --> 00:19:39,070
365 days a year, and no day
passes without some adversary

423
00:19:39,070 --> 00:19:42,140
attempting either to enter
our DOD information network

424
00:19:42,630 --> 00:19:46,403
or attempt to exploit
our DOD industrial base.

425
00:19:47,750 --> 00:19:49,070
In cyberspace, as many of you know,

426
00:19:49,070 --> 00:19:51,403
there is no sanctuary operational pause.

427
00:19:51,442 --> 00:19:53,960
In the face of these threats,

428
00:19:53,960 --> 00:19:56,110
I'd offer that our gov has moved out

429
00:19:56,370 --> 00:19:58,470
and we've moved out
rapidly to fill two roles.

430
00:19:58,470 --> 00:20:01,240
First of all, to fill the
role to better partner

431
00:20:01,480 --> 00:20:02,663
and to engage.

432
00:20:03,320 --> 00:20:04,933
Engage with public, private,

433
00:20:05,100 --> 00:20:07,163
and allied efforts to build resiliency.

434
00:20:08,060 --> 00:20:09,890
Second, we're also moving out to act.

435
00:20:09,890 --> 00:20:12,590
Act to identify and counter
threats as they developed,

436
00:20:12,640 --> 00:20:15,993
not solely in response to an
intrusion within our networks.

437
00:20:17,030 --> 00:20:19,150
Persistent engagement as we think of it

438
00:20:19,150 --> 00:20:20,180
and the way we're acting today

439
00:20:20,180 --> 00:20:21,940
sustains advantage in competition

440
00:20:22,980 --> 00:20:26,300
and prepares the cyber force
to support future operations

441
00:20:26,300 --> 00:20:29,100
whether or not they're non
kinetic or kinetic in nature.

442
00:20:30,210 --> 00:20:32,450
Persistent engagement also
keeps our forces better trained

443
00:20:32,450 --> 00:20:34,050
and a higher state of readiness.

444
00:20:34,940 --> 00:20:37,180
It increases the cost to our adversaries

445
00:20:37,180 --> 00:20:38,410
and reduces the return

446
00:20:38,720 --> 00:20:40,773
for these adversary cyber operations.

447
00:20:42,809 --> 00:20:45,240
It's really out of center both defensive

448
00:20:45,240 --> 00:20:46,773
and offensive capabilities.

449
00:20:47,630 --> 00:20:49,710
And I really want to ensure
that I emphasize this idea

450
00:20:49,710 --> 00:20:52,660
that roughly 2/3 of what we
do in persistent engagement

451
00:20:53,150 --> 00:20:55,773
is to enable defensive capabilities.

452
00:20:56,730 --> 00:20:58,710
Defending for it also allows us to learn

453
00:20:58,710 --> 00:21:01,093
adversary intentions, its capabilities,

454
00:21:01,350 --> 00:21:02,623
and its vulnerabilities.

455
00:21:03,700 --> 00:21:07,120
But persistent engagement is
also bolstered by what I offer

456
00:21:07,120 --> 00:21:10,543
as persistent presence
and persistent innovation.

457
00:21:10,980 --> 00:21:13,110
Persistent of presence has two aspects.

458
00:21:13,110 --> 00:21:15,750
First of all, the idea that
working through partnerships

459
00:21:15,750 --> 00:21:17,050
throughout our government,

460
00:21:17,420 --> 00:21:19,610
we're able to see what is happening to us

461
00:21:19,610 --> 00:21:21,533
to identify those future threats.

462
00:21:21,660 --> 00:21:23,763
We share information and enable partners.

463
00:21:24,070 --> 00:21:25,570
We're doing this continuously,

464
00:21:25,630 --> 00:21:27,483
not just in a responsive mode.

465
00:21:28,679 --> 00:21:32,090
Also through persistent
presence in foreign cyberspace

466
00:21:32,420 --> 00:21:34,850
we conduct operations to
identify and counter threats

467
00:21:34,850 --> 00:21:38,970
as they engage and emerge, and
provide improved indications

468
00:21:38,970 --> 00:21:40,420
and warnings to our partners.

469
00:21:41,260 --> 00:21:44,393
Interestingly enough, a
rapidly evolving cyber domain,

470
00:21:44,831 --> 00:21:48,247
which is populated by
learning evolving threats

471
00:21:48,247 --> 00:21:52,053
rewards speed in
innovation and operations.

472
00:21:52,460 --> 00:21:54,550
We work with partners consistently

473
00:21:54,550 --> 00:21:55,850
to ensure that they adapt.

474
00:21:56,050 --> 00:21:57,840
Adapt in their technologies, their tools,

475
00:21:57,840 --> 00:21:58,890
and their approaches.

476
00:21:59,630 --> 00:22:03,207
This idea of a posture
of persistent innovation

477
00:22:03,207 --> 00:22:05,200
across all our partnerships

478
00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:07,453
is critical to counter our adversaries.

479
00:22:08,500 --> 00:22:10,940
But as we think about this
I think it's also important

480
00:22:10,940 --> 00:22:13,210
that we think, what does
this mean for our Army?

481
00:22:13,210 --> 00:22:15,923
I would offer first of
all that, for our Army,

482
00:22:16,480 --> 00:22:20,073
our military must be able
to win should war occur,

483
00:22:20,330 --> 00:22:23,200
and compete below the
level of armed conflict.

484
00:22:23,200 --> 00:22:26,710
For our Army, we have to be
comfortable with this idea

485
00:22:26,710 --> 00:22:29,150
of being able to sustain and operate

486
00:22:29,150 --> 00:22:30,883
below the level of armed conflict.

487
00:22:31,340 --> 00:22:32,173
We're doing this today

488
00:22:32,173 --> 00:22:33,500
in terms of being able to train

489
00:22:33,500 --> 00:22:35,171
at places like the
National Training Center

490
00:22:35,171 --> 00:22:36,863
or the Direct Regional Training Center

491
00:22:36,863 --> 00:22:39,173
to ensure that we have this capability,

492
00:22:40,340 --> 00:22:43,030
to ensure that as our forces
get ready to go off to war

493
00:22:43,030 --> 00:22:45,230
that they're well
prepared and well enabled.

494
00:22:46,300 --> 00:22:47,800
Secondly, I would offer that our Army

495
00:22:47,800 --> 00:22:52,133
must continue this idea of
operating a wartime mindset

496
00:22:52,133 --> 00:22:54,223
in able to fight the network.

497
00:22:54,610 --> 00:22:58,303
Fight our network, fight our
data, fight our weapon systems.

498
00:22:59,180 --> 00:23:00,590
Our DOD information network

499
00:23:00,950 --> 00:23:02,650
facilitates everything that we do

500
00:23:03,090 --> 00:23:05,083
in terms of our military capabilities.

501
00:23:05,750 --> 00:23:07,850
This ability to continue to operate,

502
00:23:08,120 --> 00:23:11,440
to continue to maintain, to
have a measure of resiliency

503
00:23:11,690 --> 00:23:13,190
is critically important to us.

504
00:23:14,990 --> 00:23:16,180
I would also offer that the Army

505
00:23:16,180 --> 00:23:18,560
needs to be front and
center with the Joint Force

506
00:23:18,560 --> 00:23:21,610
in understanding that superiority
in the physical domain

507
00:23:22,188 --> 00:23:27,040
is based upon this idea of being
able to promote superiority

508
00:23:27,080 --> 00:23:28,363
in the cyberspace domain.

509
00:23:29,060 --> 00:23:30,350
We have to secure our weapon systems,

510
00:23:30,350 --> 00:23:32,270
we have to ensure that our dib security

511
00:23:32,270 --> 00:23:34,070
is strong working with our partners.

512
00:23:34,230 --> 00:23:35,180
We have to ensure that,

513
00:23:35,180 --> 00:23:37,208
as our partners look
at their supply chains,

514
00:23:37,208 --> 00:23:41,453
that they're well tended to,
well defended, well enabled.

515
00:23:42,540 --> 00:23:43,840
And the final thing that I would offer

516
00:23:43,840 --> 00:23:45,403
is idea for our armies that,

517
00:23:45,403 --> 00:23:47,460
what we have learned
for 200 plus years is,

518
00:23:47,460 --> 00:23:50,620
at the end of the day,
that partnerships are key

519
00:23:50,620 --> 00:23:52,320
to what we're gonna be able to do.

520
00:23:52,520 --> 00:23:54,470
And these partnerships will sustain us.

521
00:23:55,089 --> 00:23:57,943
Partnerships in a place like
cyberspace are so critical.

522
00:23:58,260 --> 00:23:59,743
If you think that today,

523
00:24:00,074 --> 00:24:02,680
we look at 90% of our
critical infrastructure

524
00:24:03,238 --> 00:24:06,313
outside of our government
with a private sector.

525
00:24:07,290 --> 00:24:08,793
Our army, our Joint Force,

526
00:24:09,260 --> 00:24:11,460
must be enabled to work
with those partners,

527
00:24:11,590 --> 00:24:14,743
not episodically but
on a consistent basis.

528
00:24:16,070 --> 00:24:17,750
I would also offer that these partnerships

529
00:24:17,750 --> 00:24:20,563
extend to our international
partners as well.

530
00:24:21,690 --> 00:24:23,050
Critical international partnerships

531
00:24:23,050 --> 00:24:24,820
that have sustained us for years

532
00:24:25,370 --> 00:24:27,270
will be critical for us in the future.

533
00:24:28,297 --> 00:24:30,510
And finally is this idea
of these partnerships

534
00:24:30,510 --> 00:24:31,960
must all be brought together.

535
00:24:32,240 --> 00:24:34,970
We in the Army understand
after 17-plus years

536
00:24:35,480 --> 00:24:36,980
the importance of a coalition,

537
00:24:37,000 --> 00:24:40,000
and I would offer for all the
threats we face in the future,

538
00:24:40,130 --> 00:24:41,730
the great opportunities await us

539
00:24:42,120 --> 00:24:44,420
are gonna be foundational
to the opportunities

540
00:24:44,470 --> 00:24:46,050
that are maintained with our partnerships.

541
00:24:46,050 --> 00:24:47,050
Thank you very much.

542
00:24:47,170 --> 00:24:49,270
- [Scotty] Thanks, General Nakasone again.

543
00:24:49,547 --> 00:24:51,797
(applause)

544
00:24:52,460 --> 00:24:55,080
I see the questions are beginning to roll,

545
00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:55,950
and we appreciate that.

546
00:24:55,950 --> 00:24:57,490
We'll get to those momentarily,

547
00:24:57,490 --> 00:24:59,410
but for now the honorable Bingen.

548
00:24:59,410 --> 00:25:00,317
Over to you.

549
00:25:00,537 --> 00:25:01,370
- Great, thanks, General Berrier.

550
00:25:01,370 --> 00:25:02,660
I want to thank General Ham

551
00:25:02,660 --> 00:25:03,990
and the whole AUSA crew.

552
00:25:03,990 --> 00:25:06,516
This is an outstanding
conference yet again this year.

553
00:25:06,516 --> 00:25:08,350
I just remember a couple years back

554
00:25:08,350 --> 00:25:09,580
going to the Eisenhower lunch

555
00:25:09,580 --> 00:25:10,413
and General Milley

556
00:25:10,413 --> 00:25:11,570
talking about the missile warfare,

557
00:25:11,570 --> 00:25:12,740
and that has still stuck with me.

558
00:25:12,740 --> 00:25:15,582
So again, outstanding conference
that you all put on here.

559
00:25:15,582 --> 00:25:17,030
It is an absolute privilege

560
00:25:17,030 --> 00:25:18,600
to be part of this distinguished panel

561
00:25:18,600 --> 00:25:21,180
and to discuss how we're
working in close partnership

562
00:25:21,180 --> 00:25:23,140
across both the defense and intelligence

563
00:25:23,140 --> 00:25:24,393
to support the Army.

564
00:25:24,610 --> 00:25:25,950
First, I wanna give a shout out

565
00:25:25,950 --> 00:25:29,328
to the 513th military
intelligence brigade down at--

566
00:25:29,328 --> 00:25:30,264
- [Scotty] Hoo-ah.

567
00:25:30,264 --> 00:25:31,681
- Hoo-ah, hoo-ah.

568
00:25:32,070 --> 00:25:32,903
The Vigilant Knights,

569
00:25:32,903 --> 00:25:34,860
I had an opportunity
to visit them last week

570
00:25:34,860 --> 00:25:36,640
and it was an awesome visit with the team

571
00:25:36,640 --> 00:25:38,590
under the leadership of Colonel Fulmer.

572
00:25:38,890 --> 00:25:40,470
I learned about the
tremendous intelligence

573
00:25:40,470 --> 00:25:41,979
and counterintelligence capabilities

574
00:25:41,979 --> 00:25:44,040
they're providing to four deployed forces

575
00:25:44,040 --> 00:25:44,940
in the CENTCOM AOR

576
00:25:45,350 --> 00:25:47,650
and to meet the dedicated
soldiers down there,

577
00:25:47,800 --> 00:25:50,370
many of whom are constantly
deployed in a theater

578
00:25:50,370 --> 00:25:52,920
and have some of the lowest
deploy to dwell ratios.

579
00:25:53,426 --> 00:25:55,900
This brigade got its
start after World War II

580
00:25:56,643 --> 00:25:59,733
in western Germany to
address the Soviet threat.

581
00:25:59,960 --> 00:26:02,360
They have a strong history
of providing intelligence

582
00:26:02,360 --> 00:26:05,060
and counterespionage support
to the US Army in Europe.

583
00:26:05,230 --> 00:26:09,221
I think the 513th is emblematic
of the challenge before us,

584
00:26:09,221 --> 00:26:11,860
continuing to provide
superior intelligence

585
00:26:11,860 --> 00:26:13,590
to our forces in harm's way today

586
00:26:13,590 --> 00:26:16,290
while also regenerating that muscle memory

587
00:26:16,310 --> 00:26:18,143
on great power competition.

588
00:26:18,610 --> 00:26:20,080
So our focus, our focus

589
00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:22,240
is implementing the
National Defense Strategy,

590
00:26:22,240 --> 00:26:24,580
which I'm sure you've
heard a lot about already

591
00:26:24,580 --> 00:26:26,053
and will continue to do so,

592
00:26:26,310 --> 00:26:31,000
with the return of near and
some cases peer competitors,

593
00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:34,100
emerging technology that is
changing the character of war

594
00:26:34,100 --> 00:26:36,593
and challenges to the
US military advantage.

595
00:26:36,730 --> 00:26:38,403
Our mission is clear.

596
00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:40,870
To deliver timely and
relevant intelligence

597
00:26:40,870 --> 00:26:43,043
to the war fighters and decision makers,

598
00:26:43,360 --> 00:26:46,490
to provide a decisive
and dominant advantage

599
00:26:46,490 --> 00:26:47,853
over our adversaries.

600
00:26:48,320 --> 00:26:51,100
I never wanna see the Army
taking on a fair fight,

601
00:26:51,100 --> 00:26:53,100
I want you to dominate the battle space

602
00:26:53,100 --> 00:26:56,010
and to have every advantage
that our nation can imagine

603
00:26:56,010 --> 00:26:56,993
and can deliver.

604
00:26:57,343 --> 00:26:59,610
So let me just highlight
a few key priorities

605
00:26:59,610 --> 00:27:00,800
of the Under Secretary of Defense

606
00:27:00,800 --> 00:27:02,743
for Intelligence along these lines.

607
00:27:03,990 --> 00:27:05,840
First, to develop the intelligence posture

608
00:27:05,840 --> 00:27:08,060
and capabilities for
contested environments

609
00:27:08,110 --> 00:27:11,250
across all domains, including
space and cyberspace,

610
00:27:11,250 --> 00:27:13,530
and through full spectrum operations,

611
00:27:13,530 --> 00:27:16,220
from nuclear and advanced
conventional environments

612
00:27:16,410 --> 00:27:19,113
to hybrid and information
operations threats.

613
00:27:19,320 --> 00:27:20,780
As General Nakasone mentioned,

614
00:27:20,780 --> 00:27:22,613
that conflict below the,

615
00:27:23,345 --> 00:27:26,563
or the activity below the
threshold of military conflict.

616
00:27:26,694 --> 00:27:28,890
The Army's focus on readiness,

617
00:27:28,890 --> 00:27:30,790
its full spectrum training focus,

618
00:27:30,790 --> 00:27:33,623
we must apply that same
thinking to intelligence,

619
00:27:33,730 --> 00:27:35,233
train as we fight.

620
00:27:36,140 --> 00:27:38,690
We want an air of superiority,
assured communications,

621
00:27:38,690 --> 00:27:40,370
assured logistics in our next fight.

622
00:27:40,370 --> 00:27:42,840
You may send your predator
in, but it may not come out.

623
00:27:42,840 --> 00:27:43,950
This is a different fight

624
00:27:43,950 --> 00:27:46,900
than the last 17-plus years of
the counter terrorism fight.

625
00:27:47,410 --> 00:27:49,170
We must think through how we do PED,

626
00:27:49,170 --> 00:27:51,200
processing exploitation dissemination,

627
00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:52,683
in a contested environment.

628
00:27:53,044 --> 00:27:56,360
We must think about our
Reachback model, our talk model,

629
00:27:56,360 --> 00:27:58,123
how we get intel out to the edge,

630
00:27:58,380 --> 00:28:00,130
supporting the speed of decision making,

631
00:28:00,130 --> 00:28:03,060
maintaining integrity of
data, maintaining OPSEC

632
00:28:03,266 --> 00:28:04,747
when we're under cyber attack

633
00:28:04,747 --> 00:28:06,733
and when our coms are degraded.

634
00:28:07,780 --> 00:28:10,120
You're seeing out of us
greater focus on resilient,

635
00:28:10,120 --> 00:28:13,216
survivable, agile ISR architectures,

636
00:28:13,216 --> 00:28:15,670
resilient communications capabilities,

637
00:28:15,670 --> 00:28:17,800
space direct down links into theater,

638
00:28:17,800 --> 00:28:21,380
DCGS integration and greater
real time accessibility

639
00:28:21,620 --> 00:28:24,023
to other services
intelligence capabilities,

640
00:28:24,470 --> 00:28:26,930
and we're still interested
in those game changers

641
00:28:26,930 --> 00:28:29,230
that give us the advantage
on the battlefield.

642
00:28:30,810 --> 00:28:33,870
Second, we're modernizing
our manual, labor intensive,

643
00:28:33,870 --> 00:28:36,763
data rich intelligence
processes and capabilities,

644
00:28:37,050 --> 00:28:40,920
leveraging commercial technology
and innovative solutions

645
00:28:40,920 --> 00:28:43,600
to deliver intelligence
at speed and at scale,

646
00:28:43,600 --> 00:28:44,893
at speed and at scale.

647
00:28:45,400 --> 00:28:48,250
We must embrace and field AI capabilities.

648
00:28:48,250 --> 00:28:49,893
We have a deluge of data,

649
00:28:50,270 --> 00:28:52,150
don't have enough analysts to analyze,

650
00:28:52,150 --> 00:28:53,873
and we couldn't do it fast enough.

651
00:28:54,550 --> 00:28:55,540
This is a perfect area

652
00:28:55,540 --> 00:28:58,080
for machines that process
large volumes of data

653
00:28:58,080 --> 00:28:59,833
and machines that learn.

654
00:29:00,230 --> 00:29:02,010
I don't want soldiers
staring at video screens,

655
00:29:02,010 --> 00:29:03,550
I want them doing the critical thinking

656
00:29:03,550 --> 00:29:05,513
and the higher order analysis.

657
00:29:06,350 --> 00:29:08,750
Project Maven and the
department is helping here

658
00:29:08,880 --> 00:29:10,410
and is the pathfinder for the department,

659
00:29:10,410 --> 00:29:11,960
we're learning a tremendous amount.

660
00:29:11,960 --> 00:29:14,893
The key is fielding, getting
the users involved early,

661
00:29:15,000 --> 00:29:17,050
getting capability out
to the field quickly,

662
00:29:17,050 --> 00:29:18,943
and then scaling that capability.

663
00:29:19,428 --> 00:29:21,330
We're also looking at how we modernize

664
00:29:21,330 --> 00:29:23,740
our foundational military
intelligence capabilities

665
00:29:23,740 --> 00:29:25,993
under General Ashley's great leadership,

666
00:29:26,830 --> 00:29:28,570
modernizing our targeting databases

667
00:29:28,570 --> 00:29:31,320
as well as we look at these
near peer and peer threats.

668
00:29:31,470 --> 00:29:33,820
Third, we're elevating defense security,

669
00:29:33,820 --> 00:29:35,840
we're transforming our personnel vetting

670
00:29:35,840 --> 00:29:37,440
and protecting critical technology

671
00:29:37,440 --> 00:29:39,773
to deliver uncompromised capabilities.

672
00:29:40,150 --> 00:29:42,130
We're reducing the
security clearance backlog

673
00:29:42,130 --> 00:29:45,540
and transforming today's manual
labor intensive processes

674
00:29:46,229 --> 00:29:51,229
that are part of our background
investigation process.

675
00:29:51,550 --> 00:29:53,690
Through greater use of
automated records checks

676
00:29:53,690 --> 00:29:56,150
and continuous evaluation
and in partnership

677
00:29:56,150 --> 00:29:57,960
and leadership from the DNI and OPM,

678
00:29:57,960 --> 00:30:00,260
we're already seeing a
reduction in the backlog.

679
00:30:00,260 --> 00:30:02,840
In the last six months, it's over 72,000

680
00:30:02,840 --> 00:30:05,373
for defense folks,
mostly army and industry.

681
00:30:05,980 --> 00:30:08,110
We're treating security
as a fourth pillar,

682
00:30:08,110 --> 00:30:10,230
or we must treat security as a
fourth pillar in acquisition,

683
00:30:10,230 --> 00:30:12,663
alongside cost to
schedule and performance.

684
00:30:13,180 --> 00:30:16,093
Our advanced technology is
being comprehensively targeted.

685
00:30:16,420 --> 00:30:17,470
We must have confidence

686
00:30:17,470 --> 00:30:20,170
that industry is delivering
our capabilities, technologies,

687
00:30:20,170 --> 00:30:23,103
weapon systems that are
uncompromised by our adversaries.

688
00:30:23,370 --> 00:30:26,040
This is going to require
strong industry partnerships,

689
00:30:26,040 --> 00:30:28,643
greater sharing of
intelligence and information,

690
00:30:28,810 --> 00:30:31,582
and we also, our defense
security service, DCSS,

691
00:30:31,582 --> 00:30:34,890
is undergoing a change to
move from a checklist approach

692
00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:36,353
to an industrial security approach

693
00:30:36,353 --> 00:30:38,963
that is more comprehensive and risk-based,

694
00:30:39,030 --> 00:30:40,710
and in some cases may be more intrusive

695
00:30:40,710 --> 00:30:42,760
than folks have been used to in the past.

696
00:30:43,270 --> 00:30:44,730
Fourth, we're deepening our reliances

697
00:30:44,730 --> 00:30:46,283
on our foreign partnerships.

698
00:30:46,430 --> 00:30:47,910
You all know far better than I

699
00:30:47,910 --> 00:30:49,683
that we operate in coalitions.

700
00:30:49,900 --> 00:30:52,760
Our combined effectiveness
depends on a shared understanding

701
00:30:52,760 --> 00:30:55,100
of the threats, shared intelligence,

702
00:30:55,100 --> 00:30:58,163
complementary accesses and
complementary capabilities.

703
00:30:58,640 --> 00:31:01,080
Our job is to provide you
those intel sharing policies

704
00:31:01,080 --> 00:31:02,743
and the resources to enable that.

705
00:31:04,130 --> 00:31:06,190
Fifth, we're increasing
enterprise integration.

706
00:31:06,190 --> 00:31:08,410
I'm really proud of the
partnership that we've struck

707
00:31:08,410 --> 00:31:11,010
with Director Coats and
with Deputy Director Gordon,

708
00:31:11,010 --> 00:31:13,526
and all the folks up here on the panel.

709
00:31:13,526 --> 00:31:16,410
There's a clear alignment
of vision of our priorities,

710
00:31:16,410 --> 00:31:19,280
and you see this through our
shared guidance that we issue,

711
00:31:19,280 --> 00:31:22,660
the collaboration and integration
on key initiatives, on AI,

712
00:31:22,660 --> 00:31:25,760
on foundational military
intelligence modernization,

713
00:31:25,760 --> 00:31:27,623
and in our pooling of resources.

714
00:31:27,740 --> 00:31:30,160
At the end of the day, we are
stewards of taxpayer dollars.

715
00:31:30,160 --> 00:31:31,950
Not MIP dollars, not NIP dollars,

716
00:31:31,950 --> 00:31:34,701
but taxpayer dollars, and we
must optimize those resources

717
00:31:34,701 --> 00:31:37,993
to maximum effect for our war fighters.

718
00:31:38,490 --> 00:31:42,030
Lastly, well, we have a lot of work ahead

719
00:31:42,030 --> 00:31:43,521
to implement the NDS.

720
00:31:43,521 --> 00:31:44,920
We have an incredible,

721
00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:46,930
incredible defense intelligence enterprise

722
00:31:46,930 --> 00:31:49,263
and an outstanding Army intelligence team.

723
00:31:49,740 --> 00:31:51,710
These are dedicated
professionals, military,

724
00:31:51,710 --> 00:31:54,235
civilian contractors
deployed around the world

725
00:31:54,235 --> 00:31:55,943
supporting the war fighter.

726
00:31:56,040 --> 00:31:58,020
We have remarkable technical capabilities,

727
00:31:58,020 --> 00:31:59,773
accesses operations,

728
00:31:59,840 --> 00:32:02,108
things that we don't talk about publicly,

729
00:32:02,108 --> 00:32:04,610
but know that there are
folks out there every day

730
00:32:04,610 --> 00:32:05,960
putting themselves in harm's way

731
00:32:05,960 --> 00:32:08,620
doing the things that you
would expect our nation to do

732
00:32:08,620 --> 00:32:09,603
to keep us safe.

733
00:32:09,750 --> 00:32:11,050
So, hoo-ah, thanks Army,

734
00:32:11,050 --> 00:32:13,700
and look forward to the rest
of the panel discussion.

735
00:32:13,742 --> 00:32:15,585
- [Scotty] Thank you, Honorable Bingen.

736
00:32:15,585 --> 00:32:17,835
(applause)

737
00:32:18,833 --> 00:32:21,033
Lieutenant General
Ashley, over to you, sir.

738
00:32:21,460 --> 00:32:22,293
- Scotty, thanks.

739
00:32:22,293 --> 00:32:25,760
And for our panel members
and everybody here today,

740
00:32:25,760 --> 00:32:26,593
thank you.

741
00:32:26,710 --> 00:32:28,293
Thanks to AUSA.

742
00:32:28,720 --> 00:32:31,224
If I could ask all our partner nations

743
00:32:31,224 --> 00:32:34,333
that are here in uniform to
please stand for just a moment.

744
00:32:35,104 --> 00:32:37,554
All the partner nations
that are here in uniform.

745
00:32:37,740 --> 00:32:39,990
(applause)

746
00:32:48,139 --> 00:32:50,120
So a message I would
like to leave you with,

747
00:32:50,120 --> 00:32:51,680
I'll talk a little bit about DIA,

748
00:32:51,680 --> 00:32:54,063
but really I wanna talk about context.

749
00:32:54,500 --> 00:32:56,760
And you've already heard that
from the other panel members

750
00:32:56,760 --> 00:32:59,803
that it's not just a
disruptive piece of technology,

751
00:32:59,999 --> 00:33:02,080
it's the context and the environment

752
00:33:02,080 --> 00:33:03,963
in which that technology is used.

753
00:33:04,000 --> 00:33:05,640
It's the doctrine that underpins it.

754
00:33:05,640 --> 00:33:08,060
It's the organizations that fight it.

755
00:33:08,060 --> 00:33:11,433
It gets into the chief's
comments about readiness.

756
00:33:11,535 --> 00:33:14,563
General Perkins, used to
be the TRADOC commander,

757
00:33:14,800 --> 00:33:15,633
had a great comment.

758
00:33:15,633 --> 00:33:17,980
He said, you have a box,
you have a technology,

759
00:33:17,980 --> 00:33:18,813
you have something,

760
00:33:18,813 --> 00:33:21,384
but until you couple
that to a trained soldier

761
00:33:21,384 --> 00:33:23,493
you do not have a capability.

762
00:33:24,430 --> 00:33:27,140
And that has resonated with me
'cause it gets into training,

763
00:33:27,140 --> 00:33:29,590
it gets into doctrine, it
gets into organization.

764
00:33:29,660 --> 00:33:31,703
It is the context in which we fight.

765
00:33:32,250 --> 00:33:34,530
So I will talk about
disruptive technologies,

766
00:33:34,530 --> 00:33:36,963
but for me, the bigger issue is,

767
00:33:37,060 --> 00:33:39,453
how do you apply that
in a future battlefield?

768
00:33:40,630 --> 00:33:43,612
If you have not read the National
Defense Strategy, grab it.

769
00:33:43,612 --> 00:33:46,070
There are three key lines of operation.

770
00:33:46,070 --> 00:33:49,006
One is lethality, the other
was how we enable our partners

771
00:33:49,006 --> 00:33:52,470
and expand our partners, and
as Bingen just mentioned,

772
00:33:52,470 --> 00:33:57,470
make sure we're good stewards
to the taxpayer's dollars.

773
00:33:58,608 --> 00:34:01,880
For us at DIA, core mission

774
00:34:02,357 --> 00:34:04,420
is to understand foreign militaries

775
00:34:04,420 --> 00:34:07,833
in the operation environment,
and that's where our focus us.

776
00:34:09,330 --> 00:34:11,420
And we are incredibly dependent

777
00:34:11,580 --> 00:34:13,203
on the other members of the IC.

778
00:34:14,430 --> 00:34:16,010
We have collection that is unique to us

779
00:34:16,010 --> 00:34:18,173
that is both technical
in the human domain,

780
00:34:18,510 --> 00:34:20,950
but the all-source
analysis that we provide

781
00:34:20,950 --> 00:34:24,040
is the aggregation of
incredible organizations

782
00:34:24,040 --> 00:34:26,700
that make up our IC, our services,

783
00:34:26,700 --> 00:34:28,200
that we put all that together.

784
00:34:28,780 --> 00:34:30,270
And so we talk about the
first line of effort,

785
00:34:30,270 --> 00:34:31,470
you talk about lethality

786
00:34:32,332 --> 00:34:34,913
and you have this image
of a kinetic strike.

787
00:34:35,720 --> 00:34:37,640
Lethality is just not about kinetics.

788
00:34:37,640 --> 00:34:38,940
So if I talk about lethality

789
00:34:38,940 --> 00:34:41,800
in the context of what
we think about, a DI,

790
00:34:41,800 --> 00:34:43,433
it's a trained analyst.

791
00:34:44,672 --> 00:34:47,253
It's the ability to
provide timely information,

792
00:34:47,253 --> 00:34:49,603
it's the ability to support a war plan.

793
00:34:50,610 --> 00:34:54,673
It's that operational and
strategic indications and warning.

794
00:34:54,912 --> 00:34:57,690
Lethality is the ability
to collect information

795
00:34:57,690 --> 00:34:59,930
that gets after what General
Nakasone talked about,

796
00:34:59,930 --> 00:35:01,443
which was intent.

797
00:35:01,888 --> 00:35:04,800
And having worked for
Secretary Mattis at CENTCOM,

798
00:35:04,800 --> 00:35:06,160
that was one of our hardest lifts,

799
00:35:06,160 --> 00:35:08,280
that one of her biggest
challenges is, he said,

800
00:35:08,280 --> 00:35:11,193
I need to know what is in
the head of my adversary.

801
00:35:11,965 --> 00:35:14,233
That's how you provide decision advantage.

802
00:35:14,884 --> 00:35:18,223
A big piece of that is how we
enable partners and allies,

803
00:35:18,657 --> 00:35:22,053
and integral to that is
how we share intelligence.

804
00:35:22,123 --> 00:35:24,810
Our partners and allies
will have insights,

805
00:35:24,810 --> 00:35:26,330
they will have placement and access,

806
00:35:26,330 --> 00:35:27,780
they will have capabilities

807
00:35:28,060 --> 00:35:30,350
that expand the collective fabric

808
00:35:30,350 --> 00:35:33,403
of what we can do as an
intelligence enterprise,

809
00:35:33,650 --> 00:35:35,240
which is why that is elevated

810
00:35:35,240 --> 00:35:37,040
to one of three key lines of effort.

811
00:35:38,040 --> 00:35:40,363
So I talk about foundational intelligence,

812
00:35:40,410 --> 00:35:42,910
and foreign militaries
think about infrastructure.

813
00:35:44,072 --> 00:35:46,853
But when you think about the
National Defense Strategy,

814
00:35:46,960 --> 00:35:49,010
what's the problem we're trying to solve?

815
00:35:49,810 --> 00:35:53,723
And it's been mentioned already,
it's the competitive space.

816
00:35:53,950 --> 00:35:55,620
We never wanna enter a fair fight,

817
00:35:55,620 --> 00:35:58,540
and that competitive space
from a technological standpoint

818
00:35:58,890 --> 00:35:59,983
is closing.

819
00:36:00,910 --> 00:36:02,960
And that's something we have to preclude.

820
00:36:03,140 --> 00:36:05,040
So that's the operational environment.

821
00:36:05,200 --> 00:36:08,640
Domains that were not contested
over the previous 17 years

822
00:36:08,640 --> 00:36:09,550
is General Nakasone,

823
00:36:09,550 --> 00:36:12,878
and he and I deployed
together into Afghanistan.

824
00:36:12,878 --> 00:36:14,613
It was the ground domain,

825
00:36:14,730 --> 00:36:16,230
it was the one area that was contested.

826
00:36:16,230 --> 00:36:18,930
We didn't worry about cyber,
we didn't worry about space,

827
00:36:18,930 --> 00:36:20,040
we didn't worry about air,

828
00:36:20,040 --> 00:36:21,893
we didn't have to worry about maritime.

829
00:36:22,500 --> 00:36:23,803
That has changed.

830
00:36:24,260 --> 00:36:25,310
But, again, the context

831
00:36:25,310 --> 00:36:29,840
is how our adversaries are
gonna fight us in those domains

832
00:36:29,966 --> 00:36:32,066
and how they're gonna use that technology.

833
00:36:33,160 --> 00:36:34,313
China, for example.

834
00:36:35,150 --> 00:36:37,273
We talk about doctrine in organization.

835
00:36:37,565 --> 00:36:39,987
They've looked at cyberspace,
electronic warfare

836
00:36:39,987 --> 00:36:41,630
and space capabilities

837
00:36:41,760 --> 00:36:44,877
and built that around a
strategies support force.

838
00:36:45,070 --> 00:36:47,540
Russia has a number of
operational constructs

839
00:36:47,540 --> 00:36:51,699
of how they determine they
wanna fight ground, air, space,

840
00:36:51,699 --> 00:36:55,879
with the intent of reducing US
effectiveness in our control

841
00:36:55,879 --> 00:36:59,363
and try to do escalation domination.

842
00:36:59,929 --> 00:37:01,110
So let me talk just a little

843
00:37:01,110 --> 00:37:03,403
about some of those
disruptive technologies,

844
00:37:03,439 --> 00:37:06,560
and it is indeed, China
and Russia looks at this

845
00:37:06,560 --> 00:37:09,723
as a race in the R&D domain

846
00:37:09,723 --> 00:37:12,033
and who's gonna chew
the first breakthrough.

847
00:37:12,690 --> 00:37:14,640
So what are some of those technologies?

848
00:37:15,075 --> 00:37:20,075
Hypersonics, advanced
materials, autonomous systems,

849
00:37:21,630 --> 00:37:24,830
artificial intelligence,
advanced computing

850
00:37:25,044 --> 00:37:27,103
and human performance.

851
00:37:27,641 --> 00:37:30,230
So just think about hypersonic propulsion

852
00:37:30,813 --> 00:37:32,590
and the geometry that's involved

853
00:37:32,590 --> 00:37:34,640
in trying to shoot a bullet with a bullet

854
00:37:35,360 --> 00:37:37,160
when the one that you're shooting at

855
00:37:38,910 --> 00:37:41,693
can turn and adjust its trajectory.

856
00:37:42,780 --> 00:37:44,803
Develops materials such as grapheme,

857
00:37:45,682 --> 00:37:47,670
where you can develop
ultralight and very strong

858
00:37:47,670 --> 00:37:51,143
flexible materials that can
operate in extreme environments,

859
00:37:51,253 --> 00:37:54,590
or photonics and how that
develops in the way of lasers

860
00:37:54,610 --> 00:37:57,653
and the impact on
communications, remote sensing,

861
00:37:57,755 --> 00:38:01,033
and the ability to develop
counter space capabilities.

862
00:38:01,506 --> 00:38:05,040
We think about A2AD, atomic sensors

863
00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:08,693
that allow you to operate
in a GPS denied environment.

864
00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:11,550
Or quantum technologies

865
00:38:12,430 --> 00:38:14,593
that deal with encryption algorithms,

866
00:38:15,950 --> 00:38:17,773
or high speed computers

867
00:38:17,773 --> 00:38:19,330
that you don't necessarily think about

868
00:38:19,330 --> 00:38:21,898
the context of what it
allows you to do for R&D

869
00:38:21,898 --> 00:38:25,450
because it allows you to get
into modeling and simulation

870
00:38:25,616 --> 00:38:28,160
where you learn and you develop,

871
00:38:28,160 --> 00:38:30,000
and you can literally
potentially take years

872
00:38:30,000 --> 00:38:33,163
off the time to develop
new weapons systems.

873
00:38:35,380 --> 00:38:38,340
And we hear a lot of discussions
about China and Russia

874
00:38:38,340 --> 00:38:39,880
in developing high speed computers

875
00:38:39,880 --> 00:38:42,493
and who has the fastest computer.

876
00:38:44,500 --> 00:38:46,850
It's not necessarily who
has the fastest computer,

877
00:38:46,850 --> 00:38:48,400
but what are you doing with it?

878
00:38:48,530 --> 00:38:50,793
What is the problem
you're trying to solve,

879
00:38:51,129 --> 00:38:53,170
and do you have an imagination

880
00:38:53,170 --> 00:38:56,350
to envision the future of the
challenges that we'll face

881
00:38:56,420 --> 00:38:58,570
and the problems that
you'll have to solve?

882
00:38:59,624 --> 00:39:00,457
Elsa Kania

883
00:39:00,457 --> 00:39:03,400
from the Center for New
American Security Technology

884
00:39:03,400 --> 00:39:06,593
had a very insightful
comment when she said,

885
00:39:06,910 --> 00:39:09,743
sometimes when somebody says,
I have a faster computer,

886
00:39:09,920 --> 00:39:11,643
it's really about a status symbol.

887
00:39:12,620 --> 00:39:15,450
The more important piece
is, how are they being used?

888
00:39:15,450 --> 00:39:17,750
What are the problems
they're trying to solve?

889
00:39:19,013 --> 00:39:20,893
Unmanned aerial vehicles,

890
00:39:21,610 --> 00:39:24,693
not only aerial but sub maritime.

891
00:39:26,900 --> 00:39:28,700
Russia's conducting feasibility tests

892
00:39:28,700 --> 00:39:30,540
on unmanned underwater vehicles

893
00:39:30,810 --> 00:39:33,020
with the intent of
delivering nuclear capability

894
00:39:33,020 --> 00:39:34,163
on a global scale.

895
00:39:34,823 --> 00:39:39,120
When we think about A2AD, we
have this very common picture

896
00:39:39,120 --> 00:39:41,623
of what that means for air defense.

897
00:39:42,490 --> 00:39:43,840
What about under the water?

898
00:39:45,120 --> 00:39:47,593
And China both recognized
the long term R&D

899
00:39:47,710 --> 00:39:50,313
of artificial intelligence
and what that means,

900
00:39:50,397 --> 00:39:53,723
not just for security
but for economic issues,

901
00:39:53,890 --> 00:39:57,373
for knowledge management and
how they operate as a nation.

902
00:39:59,366 --> 00:40:01,620
And that R&D and that competitiveness

903
00:40:02,060 --> 00:40:03,860
that happens in all the universities

904
00:40:04,080 --> 00:40:08,563
in the academic institutions
across the globe in education.

905
00:40:09,200 --> 00:40:12,030
China is progressively
pursuing a 2025 strategy

906
00:40:12,320 --> 00:40:15,063
where they want to be
the main driver of AI,

907
00:40:15,730 --> 00:40:16,720
not only for their economic

908
00:40:16,720 --> 00:40:18,520
but their industrial transformation.

909
00:40:19,140 --> 00:40:21,020
Many of you are familiar
with Putin's quote,

910
00:40:21,020 --> 00:40:23,803
whoever becomes master of
AI will rule the world,

911
00:40:23,956 --> 00:40:27,913
and at the same time express
a degree of fear in that idea.

912
00:40:28,225 --> 00:40:30,210
We talked about the nature of war

913
00:40:30,210 --> 00:40:32,850
as defined by Thucydides
was about fear, honor,

914
00:40:32,850 --> 00:40:33,683
and interest,

915
00:40:34,144 --> 00:40:37,533
but the character of war
is constantly changing,

916
00:40:37,783 --> 00:40:39,430
and as we see AI

917
00:40:39,480 --> 00:40:41,939
we see some of these
disruptive technologies,

918
00:40:41,939 --> 00:40:44,623
they continue to change
the character of war,

919
00:40:44,870 --> 00:40:48,553
the complexity and the
speed of human interaction.

920
00:40:49,987 --> 00:40:54,987
But our task is to
understand how they operate.

921
00:40:56,320 --> 00:40:57,963
What's the defeat mechanism?

922
00:40:58,380 --> 00:41:00,603
What's the target system analysis,

923
00:41:01,020 --> 00:41:02,530
and how do we find the vulnerabilities

924
00:41:02,530 --> 00:41:04,480
in those weapon systems to defeat them?

925
00:41:06,020 --> 00:41:07,063
Another key area,

926
00:41:07,800 --> 00:41:09,463
human performance enhancement.

927
00:41:10,840 --> 00:41:13,653
For China, three phases.

928
00:41:13,940 --> 00:41:15,640
They started with the digital age.

929
00:41:16,290 --> 00:41:18,110
It's moving into artificial intelligence

930
00:41:18,110 --> 00:41:21,433
with neural networks,
and then the next step,

931
00:41:22,172 --> 00:41:24,983
the integration of human and machines.

932
00:41:27,646 --> 00:41:31,099
Cognitive advances, not
just in how we think,

933
00:41:31,099 --> 00:41:34,403
but think about stamina
of the individual soldier,

934
00:41:35,226 --> 00:41:37,823
the ability to think through problems.

935
00:41:40,615 --> 00:41:43,113
And think about the ethical impact

936
00:41:44,022 --> 00:41:48,163
of those kinds of technologies
and how they will be applied.

937
00:41:50,728 --> 00:41:54,273
And how does a democracy view
those kinds of technologies?

938
00:41:55,070 --> 00:41:57,623
How will Russia and China leverage those,

939
00:41:58,840 --> 00:41:59,700
and the hard decisions

940
00:41:59,700 --> 00:42:02,623
that we will have to make to keep pace.

941
00:42:05,950 --> 00:42:09,660
So we talked about DI's role,
we look at foreign militaries,

942
00:42:09,660 --> 00:42:11,660
foundational intelligence, and

943
00:42:13,151 --> 00:42:14,730
to leave with you that thought,

944
00:42:14,730 --> 00:42:17,230
we can never divorce ourselves
from the operational context

945
00:42:17,230 --> 00:42:19,363
in which disruptive technology is used.

946
00:42:20,370 --> 00:42:22,290
It reminds me of the
comment by Michael O'Hanlon

947
00:42:22,290 --> 00:42:24,740
in the book he wrote, The
Future of Land Warfare.

948
00:42:25,588 --> 00:42:28,270
And a question I asked Peter
Singer on this very panel

949
00:42:28,270 --> 00:42:31,500
two years ago, I said,
what is the disruptive?

950
00:42:31,500 --> 00:42:34,090
What is that one technology
that you see emerging

951
00:42:34,100 --> 00:42:36,280
that will be a game changer that a nation

952
00:42:36,280 --> 00:42:38,730
will have that will give
them a marked advantage.

953
00:42:39,205 --> 00:42:40,850
And Peter's answer was very similar

954
00:42:40,850 --> 00:42:43,000
to what Michael O'Hanlon
wrote in his book.

955
00:42:44,040 --> 00:42:46,663
He said, it's how you operationalize it.

956
00:42:47,840 --> 00:42:49,740
That's where you'll get the advantage.

957
00:42:50,060 --> 00:42:52,343
And for nations like the United States,

958
00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:55,240
it will make us better at something

959
00:42:55,240 --> 00:42:57,083
we already do very very well.

960
00:42:58,500 --> 00:42:59,940
And so, for me as I think about this,

961
00:42:59,940 --> 00:43:03,823
and I envision that device.

962
00:43:04,720 --> 00:43:05,923
Go back 20 years ago.

963
00:43:06,900 --> 00:43:09,833
Who would have ever thought you
had that power in your hand?

964
00:43:11,230 --> 00:43:13,730
So in many ways, as we think
about disruptive technology,

965
00:43:13,730 --> 00:43:15,083
whether it's dual use,

966
00:43:15,570 --> 00:43:19,020
for everything that has a
positive use for mankind,

967
00:43:19,020 --> 00:43:21,430
someone is gonna look for a nefarious way

968
00:43:21,430 --> 00:43:23,283
to put that into operation.

969
00:43:23,918 --> 00:43:25,050
And so, as we think about

970
00:43:25,050 --> 00:43:28,810
how we counter these different
technologies, for me,

971
00:43:28,810 --> 00:43:32,283
one of the risks becomes
a lack of imagination.

972
00:43:33,850 --> 00:43:36,080
So think about between World
War I and World War II.

973
00:43:36,080 --> 00:43:38,960
A young 24 year old named Victor Krulak

974
00:43:39,380 --> 00:43:41,980
had an idea that he took
the leadership of the Navy.

975
00:43:42,440 --> 00:43:45,733
It was about a concept for
both that could do landings.

976
00:43:46,380 --> 00:43:47,473
It was discounted.

977
00:43:48,070 --> 00:43:50,660
It got picked up by a
man named Andrew Higgins,

978
00:43:50,660 --> 00:43:53,927
and that became the means by which D-day

979
00:43:53,927 --> 00:43:56,643
and so many other assaults
over the shore were launch.

980
00:43:57,261 --> 00:44:00,133
So for me, it's not only
understanding context,

981
00:44:00,380 --> 00:44:03,010
it's making sure that there's
never a lack of imagination

982
00:44:03,010 --> 00:44:07,240
from industry, from our
partners, and from America

983
00:44:07,240 --> 00:44:09,440
in terms of when we
look at the technologies

984
00:44:09,660 --> 00:44:12,293
and what we envision the
future fight might entail.

985
00:44:12,410 --> 00:44:13,243
Thank you.

986
00:44:13,690 --> 00:44:15,024
- [Scotty] Thank you, General Ashley.

987
00:44:15,024 --> 00:44:17,274
(applause)

988
00:44:20,630 --> 00:44:22,430
Director Cardillo, over to you, sir.

989
00:44:22,830 --> 00:44:23,693
- Thanks, Scotty,

990
00:44:23,860 --> 00:44:26,990
and I join in my panel's
mutual admiration,

991
00:44:26,990 --> 00:44:29,640
it's a pleasure to be with you all here.

992
00:44:29,640 --> 00:44:33,800
I have two bosses on the
panel, Kerry and Sue.

993
00:44:33,800 --> 00:44:36,560
Sue started our
conversation with an analogy

994
00:44:36,702 --> 00:44:38,900
using a baseball term, murderer's row,

995
00:44:38,900 --> 00:44:42,280
comes from the '20s and
'30s New York Yankees lineup

996
00:44:42,280 --> 00:44:43,133
at the time.

997
00:44:43,330 --> 00:44:46,722
So I am now at the tail end of that row,

998
00:44:46,722 --> 00:44:49,410
and I apologize to international partners

999
00:44:49,410 --> 00:44:50,760
who don't have a baseball background,

1000
00:44:50,760 --> 00:44:55,503
but you tend to put your
weakest hitter, the pitcher,

1001
00:44:56,007 --> 00:44:57,380
at the end of the row.

1002
00:44:57,380 --> 00:44:58,950
So I'm gonna try to do something

1003
00:44:58,950 --> 00:45:00,080
other than a sacrifice bunt.

1004
00:45:00,080 --> 00:45:02,463
By the way, we're up four-northing, team,

1005
00:45:02,660 --> 00:45:05,193
because you've all hit it out of the park.

1006
00:45:06,270 --> 00:45:08,830
Seriously, the real risk
to being in this position

1007
00:45:08,830 --> 00:45:13,210
on this table is that a lot of
my points that I have drafted

1008
00:45:13,346 --> 00:45:15,570
will have been made. I don't
know if you've noticed,

1009
00:45:15,570 --> 00:45:17,480
I was doing some hunting
and pecking over here.

1010
00:45:17,480 --> 00:45:19,380
So I'll share with you my remarks now.

1011
00:45:20,720 --> 00:45:23,923
I've deleted everything
because it's been covered.

1012
00:45:25,640 --> 00:45:28,140
But before you get too excited,

1013
00:45:28,140 --> 00:45:30,613
I had some time to
create some new remarks.

1014
00:45:31,961 --> 00:45:36,757
Look, in a much more serious
note, it's wonderful to be here

1015
00:45:36,757 --> 00:45:40,100
at this convention and having
this conversation because,

1016
00:45:40,100 --> 00:45:44,163
as my colleagues have noted,
this is our advantage.

1017
00:45:45,407 --> 00:45:48,923
These challenges, these partnerships,

1018
00:45:49,040 --> 00:45:50,690
the opportunities that are created

1019
00:45:50,690 --> 00:45:53,310
by the conversations that
are created in this room,

1020
00:45:53,310 --> 00:45:55,110
but more importantly in that hallway

1021
00:45:55,320 --> 00:45:57,230
and at the coffee break,
and tomorrow at breakfast

1022
00:45:57,230 --> 00:46:00,150
are exactly what leads to the advantage

1023
00:46:00,150 --> 00:46:01,763
that we must protect.

1024
00:46:02,480 --> 00:46:03,570
I am privileged enough

1025
00:46:03,570 --> 00:46:06,590
to be able to lead the geospatial
intelligence profession

1026
00:46:06,590 --> 00:46:07,540
for our government.

1027
00:46:07,960 --> 00:46:09,650
I do that both as the functional manager

1028
00:46:09,650 --> 00:46:11,083
and the director of MGA.

1029
00:46:11,330 --> 00:46:13,230
I stumbled into this profession

1030
00:46:13,230 --> 00:46:17,810
under President Reagan's
hiring acceleration in 1983.

1031
00:46:18,380 --> 00:46:23,010
Got very very lucky to become
a member of this profession.

1032
00:46:23,010 --> 00:46:25,440
I got even luckier with
a series of mentors

1033
00:46:25,745 --> 00:46:28,020
who guided my career in such a way

1034
00:46:28,020 --> 00:46:30,360
that made this postilion
possible on the other end.

1035
00:46:30,360 --> 00:46:32,060
But the reason I bring it up is two-fold.

1036
00:46:32,060 --> 00:46:35,210
It's my current job, it's
the profession that I love,

1037
00:46:35,210 --> 00:46:40,210
but our ties with the United
States Army are long and true,

1038
00:46:40,560 --> 00:46:43,593
and the agency's only 22 years old.

1039
00:46:43,874 --> 00:46:46,223
The profession is old as mankind.

1040
00:46:47,340 --> 00:46:48,335
We, by the way,

1041
00:46:48,335 --> 00:46:53,098
borrow your first commander
in the US Continental Army

1042
00:46:53,098 --> 00:46:55,170
as our employee number one

1043
00:46:55,170 --> 00:46:57,760
because of his surveying
and map making skills,

1044
00:46:57,760 --> 00:47:00,610
and that he chartered both the surveyor

1045
00:47:00,610 --> 00:47:03,777
and the cartographer of the Army in 1777.

1046
00:47:03,777 --> 00:47:06,743
And if you think about
what Washington was facing,

1047
00:47:07,200 --> 00:47:12,200
the world's dominant military
power with under trained,

1048
00:47:12,225 --> 00:47:16,824
under-equipped, under-organized
militia, really,

1049
00:47:16,824 --> 00:47:21,093
shopkeepers and farmers,
and a few good partners.

1050
00:47:21,612 --> 00:47:23,303
How did he do it?

1051
00:47:23,670 --> 00:47:25,033
He mastered the terrain.

1052
00:47:25,760 --> 00:47:28,180
He saw it and obtained the high ground

1053
00:47:28,180 --> 00:47:30,963
in order to see further, as Sue mentioned.

1054
00:47:31,548 --> 00:47:36,548
He knew the risks of
employment of inferior forces

1055
00:47:37,568 --> 00:47:40,653
given the geography that surrounded them,

1056
00:47:41,103 --> 00:47:43,894
and he employed it in a way

1057
00:47:43,894 --> 00:47:46,910
in which created asymmetric advantage

1058
00:47:47,770 --> 00:47:49,820
which is what all of us
have talked about now

1059
00:47:49,820 --> 00:47:52,453
as the dominant military
force on the planet,

1060
00:47:52,920 --> 00:47:54,890
our adversaries are gonna look for

1061
00:47:55,300 --> 00:47:58,603
and take advantage of
asymmetric advantage.

1062
00:48:00,306 --> 00:48:02,705
I think, as we sit here today

1063
00:48:02,705 --> 00:48:04,610
and as we think of the advent

1064
00:48:04,610 --> 00:48:06,840
and the growth of the profession

1065
00:48:06,840 --> 00:48:08,643
that I'm privileged to lead,

1066
00:48:09,150 --> 00:48:11,460
you can move from the higher terrain

1067
00:48:11,460 --> 00:48:12,870
that Washington may have achieved

1068
00:48:12,870 --> 00:48:15,060
through climbing to the
lighter than air vehicles

1069
00:48:15,060 --> 00:48:18,663
that were employed in the
Civil War to see further

1070
00:48:18,663 --> 00:48:22,483
and understand the threat
during that engagement,

1071
00:48:23,068 --> 00:48:28,068
and we should remind ourselves
that, even in the 1860s

1072
00:48:28,730 --> 00:48:33,023
Lincoln employed a telegraph
wire to go into the basket

1073
00:48:33,023 --> 00:48:36,723
up to the observer to get
real time intelligence.

1074
00:48:37,810 --> 00:48:39,533
That's 150 years ago.

1075
00:48:41,090 --> 00:48:43,750
Those lighter than air
vehicles became powered flight,

1076
00:48:43,750 --> 00:48:45,330
World War I and World War II

1077
00:48:45,620 --> 00:48:48,423
and the advance of photography
and camera and lenses,

1078
00:48:49,150 --> 00:48:52,827
and then through the wizardry
of those partnerships

1079
00:48:52,827 --> 00:48:55,477
and the innovations that I
described at the beginning

1080
00:48:56,280 --> 00:48:58,440
were employed by this country

1081
00:48:58,440 --> 00:49:01,190
through a government and
industrial partnership

1082
00:49:01,190 --> 00:49:06,190
to give President Eisenhower
insight into denied territory,

1083
00:49:06,280 --> 00:49:07,693
that being the Soviet Union.

1084
00:49:08,391 --> 00:49:10,940
Through an airplane that, at the time,

1085
00:49:10,940 --> 00:49:12,840
we thought flew higher than the threat

1086
00:49:13,490 --> 00:49:16,114
in order to expose and understand

1087
00:49:16,114 --> 00:49:19,993
what exactly the nature of that threat.

1088
00:49:20,570 --> 00:49:25,570
That ended May of 1960
because the weapon system,

1089
00:49:25,995 --> 00:49:27,730
the Soviet weapon system,

1090
00:49:27,730 --> 00:49:30,163
was capable of bringing
down that aircraft.

1091
00:49:31,298 --> 00:49:33,390
And it ended the insight
that the president

1092
00:49:33,390 --> 00:49:35,813
needed to understand that threat.

1093
00:49:37,070 --> 00:49:39,923
And yet, just three months
later, August of 1960,

1094
00:49:40,238 --> 00:49:42,890
the United States government
employed its first

1095
00:49:43,120 --> 00:49:46,763
imagery intelligence system from space.

1096
00:49:47,750 --> 00:49:49,783
That's 58 years ago.

1097
00:49:50,390 --> 00:49:52,513
And again, where did that come from?

1098
00:49:53,143 --> 00:49:55,210
True wizardry, in this case,

1099
00:49:55,210 --> 00:49:59,600
between partners at Langley
and partners in California,

1100
00:49:59,600 --> 00:50:04,173
and industry and academic
leaders, and creating, then,

1101
00:50:04,241 --> 00:50:05,960
creating, then, a system

1102
00:50:05,960 --> 00:50:08,643
by which you could look
into denied territory.

1103
00:50:10,180 --> 00:50:15,177
1960, for almost 50 years,
I would offer, that we,

1104
00:50:15,177 --> 00:50:16,980
in our profession,

1105
00:50:16,980 --> 00:50:19,893
provide an advantage
through exclusive access.

1106
00:50:20,698 --> 00:50:24,370
It's the kind of advantage
created the unfair fights,

1107
00:50:24,370 --> 00:50:26,860
it created that insight
seeing before events,

1108
00:50:26,860 --> 00:50:28,973
acting before events dictate.

1109
00:50:29,380 --> 00:50:32,223
All of that was created because
we had exclusive access.

1110
00:50:33,060 --> 00:50:35,230
Now, with the commercialization
of technology,

1111
00:50:35,230 --> 00:50:38,620
not just the iPhone in
our interconnected world,

1112
00:50:38,620 --> 00:50:42,663
but the planet today is simply
being sensed differently,

1113
00:50:43,070 --> 00:50:45,860
more holistically, more continually,

1114
00:50:45,860 --> 00:50:48,293
more persistently than
it ever has been before.

1115
00:50:50,210 --> 00:50:53,123
And I happen to think
that's a wonderful advance.

1116
00:50:53,690 --> 00:50:55,850
It's creating an
understanding of our planet

1117
00:50:55,850 --> 00:51:00,850
insights into human and
cultural understanding,

1118
00:51:01,810 --> 00:51:05,658
better use of land,
better crop management,

1119
00:51:05,658 --> 00:51:10,658
better understanding of threats,
be they weather or disease.

1120
00:51:11,960 --> 00:51:13,500
And I also believe strongly

1121
00:51:13,500 --> 00:51:17,820
that democracies thrive
in that light, and that,

1122
00:51:17,820 --> 00:51:22,820
if you can create more
understanding, like minded partners

1123
00:51:23,970 --> 00:51:26,753
can see outcomes that can
be mutually beneficial.

1124
00:51:28,196 --> 00:51:31,000
But with that advance
and with that sensing now

1125
00:51:31,150 --> 00:51:34,583
is a more leveling of the playing field,

1126
00:51:34,650 --> 00:51:37,082
and so that exclusive advantage
that we used to provide

1127
00:51:37,082 --> 00:51:39,373
is now more common.

1128
00:51:39,803 --> 00:51:43,253
So, again, to repeat

1129
00:51:43,253 --> 00:51:47,163
and build on an echo
comment you've heard before,

1130
00:51:48,090 --> 00:51:49,993
ours is now to operate differently.

1131
00:51:50,850 --> 00:51:53,040
We have to innovate inside the cycle

1132
00:51:53,120 --> 00:51:55,453
of adversary ill intent.

1133
00:51:55,550 --> 00:52:00,550
We have to create the same
outcome, that advantage,

1134
00:52:00,600 --> 00:52:03,653
that decision space,
that operational time,

1135
00:52:03,980 --> 00:52:05,720
for the commander to be able to act

1136
00:52:05,720 --> 00:52:07,240
before that event dictates,

1137
00:52:07,240 --> 00:52:08,850
we just have to do it differently.

1138
00:52:08,850 --> 00:52:11,810
So at NGA and with
geospatial intelligence,

1139
00:52:11,810 --> 00:52:16,810
we're engaging vigorously
with these new communities,

1140
00:52:17,660 --> 00:52:20,503
whether those be industry,
whether they be academic,

1141
00:52:20,503 --> 00:52:23,363
and whether they be
international partners.

1142
00:52:23,895 --> 00:52:27,040
And just as each of those
bring us opportunity,

1143
00:52:27,040 --> 00:52:28,340
they also bring risks.

1144
00:52:28,340 --> 00:52:31,503
Some of my panel have
mentioned those risks.

1145
00:52:31,804 --> 00:52:35,190
So in an era in which we have
more shared understanding,

1146
00:52:35,190 --> 00:52:37,580
we also have shared risk

1147
00:52:39,130 --> 00:52:41,800
about the fidelity of the information

1148
00:52:41,800 --> 00:52:43,700
upon which we have that understanding.

1149
00:52:43,970 --> 00:52:46,520
It's the whole issue of
what's real and what's not.

1150
00:52:46,830 --> 00:52:48,010
It's the whole issue of,

1151
00:52:48,010 --> 00:52:50,220
have you been able to protect your data

1152
00:52:50,220 --> 00:52:52,470
in such a way that you
have the confidence in it

1153
00:52:52,470 --> 00:52:53,520
to make the decision?

1154
00:52:54,010 --> 00:52:58,403
That's been our requirement
from day one in this profession,

1155
00:52:58,992 --> 00:53:02,320
because the world is so connected

1156
00:53:02,320 --> 00:53:04,570
and because we are so dependent now

1157
00:53:04,570 --> 00:53:06,393
on this interconnected world,

1158
00:53:06,630 --> 00:53:10,163
we have to get much better at
making sure that our pedigree,

1159
00:53:10,620 --> 00:53:14,113
our resilience, is sustained as well.

1160
00:53:15,060 --> 00:53:16,900
And I'll finish with the comment that,

1161
00:53:16,900 --> 00:53:18,983
again, back to this conference.

1162
00:53:19,062 --> 00:53:22,640
The advances that I reflected,

1163
00:53:22,640 --> 00:53:24,780
whether they were telegraph wire

1164
00:53:24,780 --> 00:53:26,540
up to a lighter than air vehicle

1165
00:53:26,980 --> 00:53:29,357
or the corona system in 1960

1166
00:53:29,357 --> 00:53:31,393
and all the innovation since then,

1167
00:53:32,479 --> 00:53:34,723
all of that happened through partnerships.

1168
00:53:35,420 --> 00:53:37,930
All of it happened through
somebody having an idea

1169
00:53:37,930 --> 00:53:41,633
that was probably discounted
once or twice, or three times,

1170
00:53:42,210 --> 00:53:45,920
and yet somebody persisting in
bringing up that added value

1171
00:53:46,191 --> 00:53:49,093
and staying focused on that outcome.

1172
00:53:49,237 --> 00:53:51,400
To me, the AUSA convention

1173
00:53:51,400 --> 00:53:54,000
is a perfect forum with a great history

1174
00:53:54,000 --> 00:53:55,583
of just those conversations,

1175
00:53:55,930 --> 00:53:58,620
and I look forward to having
one of those conversations

1176
00:53:58,620 --> 00:54:01,123
with you now as we turn to
your questions and answers.

1177
00:54:01,123 --> 00:54:02,870
Your questions, our answers.

1178
00:54:02,870 --> 00:54:03,703
Thank you very much.

1179
00:54:03,703 --> 00:54:05,303
- [Scotty] Thank you, Director Caudillo.

1180
00:54:06,006 --> 00:54:08,256
(applause)

1181
00:54:09,780 --> 00:54:11,160
Okay, so now comes the fun part.

1182
00:54:11,160 --> 00:54:13,780
We've got a number of really
interesting questions here,

1183
00:54:13,780 --> 00:54:15,614
and I think the way I'll start this is

1184
00:54:15,614 --> 00:54:17,520
I'll throw a few out for the panel,

1185
00:54:17,520 --> 00:54:18,870
and then I will get selective

1186
00:54:18,870 --> 00:54:20,190
based on questions that have come in

1187
00:54:20,190 --> 00:54:21,150
for an individual panelist.

1188
00:54:21,150 --> 00:54:24,170
So for the entire panel,
and honorable Gordon,

1189
00:54:24,170 --> 00:54:26,047
since you're the closest to
me, we'll have you go first.

1190
00:54:26,047 --> 00:54:27,426
- I need to talk to my agent.

1191
00:54:27,426 --> 00:54:28,973
- Here's the question.

1192
00:54:29,010 --> 00:54:31,413
What and how has our
intelligence community

1193
00:54:31,413 --> 00:54:34,510
being changed to move
from a reactive posture

1194
00:54:34,510 --> 00:54:38,403
to a proactive posture
that influences operations?

1195
00:54:38,787 --> 00:54:43,513
- Probably two things, and
I'd say both surround data.

1196
00:54:43,713 --> 00:54:46,010
The first is post 9/11

1197
00:54:46,010 --> 00:54:48,340
where we redoubled our efforts
to be able to integrate

1198
00:54:48,340 --> 00:54:52,703
across all the members of
the intelligence community

1199
00:54:52,703 --> 00:54:55,620
so that anyone had available to them

1200
00:54:55,620 --> 00:54:59,340
was what all of us had
to offer, and with that

1201
00:55:00,088 --> 00:55:05,088
came the investment in
information infrastructure

1202
00:55:05,309 --> 00:55:06,990
that would allow that to happen.

1203
00:55:06,990 --> 00:55:11,737
So integration is not just a catchphrase,

1204
00:55:11,737 --> 00:55:14,600
it really is just making
sure that we all have,

1205
00:55:14,600 --> 00:55:19,183
and you all have the best
of what we have available.

1206
00:55:19,915 --> 00:55:22,703
That was work of my predecessors.

1207
00:55:23,140 --> 00:55:27,170
I would say the work that
we are now engaged in,

1208
00:55:27,170 --> 00:55:29,780
and this is something that
Kari and I worked on a lot,

1209
00:55:29,780 --> 00:55:33,120
is to make sure that there
is no artificial boundary

1210
00:55:33,120 --> 00:55:37,433
between national intelligence,
military intelligence,

1211
00:55:37,433 --> 00:55:39,480
tactical intelligence, as though

1212
00:55:39,480 --> 00:55:43,293
that is some sort of
differentiation that matters.

1213
00:55:43,560 --> 00:55:47,710
The ability to get from
a strategic question

1214
00:55:47,710 --> 00:55:52,710
to a operator use in
the short amount of time

1215
00:55:54,810 --> 00:55:57,340
that is required to
respond to a world that

1216
00:55:57,340 --> 00:56:01,950
is turning faster than the
systems that we each involve.

1217
00:56:01,950 --> 00:56:03,620
So an infrastructure

1218
00:56:03,630 --> 00:56:05,550
allows for integration in the best,

1219
00:56:05,550 --> 00:56:08,607
and a connection between
national intelligence

1220
00:56:08,607 --> 00:56:10,330
and military intelligence

1221
00:56:10,590 --> 00:56:14,103
so that operational speeds are possible.

1222
00:56:15,675 --> 00:56:16,733
- [Scotty] Hoo-ah.

1223
00:56:16,890 --> 00:56:19,440
General Nakasone, shall I
repeat the question, sir?

1224
00:56:19,930 --> 00:56:20,820
- No, I think I have it

1225
00:56:20,820 --> 00:56:22,660
from the response that
just came there, General,

1226
00:56:22,660 --> 00:56:23,493
thanks a lot.

1227
00:56:23,940 --> 00:56:24,800
So what did we learn?

1228
00:56:24,800 --> 00:56:28,300
I wholly concur with Deputy
Director Gordon here.

1229
00:56:28,300 --> 00:56:31,333
This idea over the past 17 years is,

1230
00:56:31,333 --> 00:56:35,994
our speed got much better because
we had to get much better.

1231
00:56:35,994 --> 00:56:40,633
Think about the 12th of September 2001.

1232
00:56:41,330 --> 00:56:43,500
I remember that, being at the
Pentagon the 12th of September

1233
00:56:43,500 --> 00:56:45,780
wondering, who were
they, what did they do,

1234
00:56:45,780 --> 00:56:49,063
how did they do it, and what
we were gonna do about it.

1235
00:56:49,345 --> 00:56:51,310
In a matter of three to four years,

1236
00:56:51,310 --> 00:56:54,510
suddenly we had rapidly
transformed ourselves.

1237
00:56:54,510 --> 00:56:56,930
We were inside our
adversary's decision loop,

1238
00:56:56,930 --> 00:57:00,713
we were passing information
quicker than they could imagine.

1239
00:57:00,750 --> 00:57:02,850
We were taking things off the battlefield.

1240
00:57:02,867 --> 00:57:04,680
To Honorable Gordon's point,

1241
00:57:04,680 --> 00:57:09,680
I would offer also this idea
of whatever was at the endpoint

1242
00:57:10,600 --> 00:57:12,020
was always critical for us,

1243
00:57:12,020 --> 00:57:13,940
because we had to take it so rapidly

1244
00:57:14,340 --> 00:57:17,250
and turn insights for a
number of different partners

1245
00:57:17,250 --> 00:57:19,920
that were either
contributing to the answer

1246
00:57:19,920 --> 00:57:23,193
that we're looking for
or actioning it rapidly.

1247
00:57:23,900 --> 00:57:26,610
That doesn't change in terms
of our ability to be proactive

1248
00:57:26,610 --> 00:57:27,443
in the future.

1249
00:57:28,570 --> 00:57:31,680
While our threats may
change and the adversaries

1250
00:57:31,680 --> 00:57:33,483
that we may face in the future,

1251
00:57:34,250 --> 00:57:37,543
this whole idea of speed
is rapidly upon us.

1252
00:57:37,963 --> 00:57:41,940
As we think of 10 gigabits
at the endpoint with 5G

1253
00:57:42,110 --> 00:57:43,513
and the Internet of Things,

1254
00:57:44,370 --> 00:57:46,140
think about how fast our
intelligence system's

1255
00:57:46,140 --> 00:57:47,190
gonna have to operate

1256
00:57:47,900 --> 00:57:49,760
and how rapidly we're gonna
have to turn that data.

1257
00:57:49,760 --> 00:57:51,003
We're doing that today.

1258
00:57:51,070 --> 00:57:53,330
We're doing it at places like
the National Security Agency,

1259
00:57:53,330 --> 00:57:56,333
NGA, throughout our
intelligence community,

1260
00:57:56,772 --> 00:57:59,720
and I am very very very very pleased

1261
00:57:59,720 --> 00:58:02,100
in terms of what we're
seeing now, but more and more

1262
00:58:02,100 --> 00:58:04,325
I'm also saying I'm very very excited

1263
00:58:04,325 --> 00:58:06,123
about what we're gonna
be able to do tomorrow.

1264
00:58:07,040 --> 00:58:07,873
- [Scotty] Thank you.

1265
00:58:07,873 --> 00:58:08,706
Honorable Bingen?

1266
00:58:09,522 --> 00:58:11,603
- I think I have to echo
what others have said.

1267
00:58:11,603 --> 00:58:15,913
As Gordon and General
Nakasone hit it well.

1268
00:58:16,000 --> 00:58:17,350
The other thing I'd say is,

1269
00:58:17,593 --> 00:58:19,410
the first step of recognizing
you have a problem

1270
00:58:19,410 --> 00:58:20,840
is recognizing you have a problem,

1271
00:58:20,840 --> 00:58:22,890
and I think one of the
common things you've heard

1272
00:58:22,890 --> 00:58:24,423
across the panel here was,

1273
00:58:24,660 --> 00:58:28,380
we've spent the last 17-plus
years focused on a CT fight,

1274
00:58:28,380 --> 00:58:32,060
and rightly so, but you
now have a recognition,

1275
00:58:32,060 --> 00:58:35,160
and the National Strategy and
the National Defense Strategy

1276
00:58:35,160 --> 00:58:38,620
hit this home that we
have to make a change.

1277
00:58:38,620 --> 00:58:40,717
That, while we need to be
doing those kinds of things,

1278
00:58:40,717 --> 00:58:42,493
and that threat will still persist,

1279
00:58:42,600 --> 00:58:44,950
you have a near peer-to-peer competitor

1280
00:58:44,950 --> 00:58:47,850
that is forcing us to change

1281
00:58:47,850 --> 00:58:50,780
how we think about our
intelligence capabilities,

1282
00:58:50,780 --> 00:58:52,333
our posture, our investments.

1283
00:58:52,910 --> 00:58:54,410
I think what's been fascinating now

1284
00:58:54,410 --> 00:58:56,403
being among these folks

1285
00:58:56,403 --> 00:58:59,742
is seeing some of the
different intelligence areas

1286
00:58:59,742 --> 00:59:02,320
that have been stressed now
that haven't been before,

1287
00:59:02,320 --> 00:59:05,860
and getting after, getting
ahead of some of these threats.

1288
00:59:05,860 --> 00:59:07,120
So economic intelligence,

1289
00:59:07,120 --> 00:59:08,550
hadn't seen as much of that before,

1290
00:59:08,550 --> 00:59:10,983
but when you look at
where China's heading,

1291
00:59:10,983 --> 00:59:13,463
I'm seeing a lot more in that area.

1292
00:59:14,181 --> 00:59:15,610
We're seeing a lot of focus now

1293
00:59:15,610 --> 00:59:18,480
on research and development
on R&D, and also

1294
00:59:18,480 --> 00:59:21,230
we're putting some clear bets
on some game changing areas,

1295
00:59:21,230 --> 00:59:24,040
both technologies and
other concepts that, again,

1296
00:59:24,040 --> 00:59:26,703
will help us get ahead in
that contested environment.

1297
00:59:27,760 --> 00:59:28,930
- [Sue] Can I jump back in?

1298
00:59:28,930 --> 00:59:29,980
- [Scotty] Yes, ma'am, go ahead.

1299
00:59:29,980 --> 00:59:31,670
- Even though I started this,

1300
00:59:31,670 --> 00:59:33,210
I'm taking a second bite of the apple

1301
00:59:33,210 --> 00:59:35,060
based on what Kari said.

1302
00:59:35,060 --> 00:59:38,220
I think the other thing
that the last few years

1303
00:59:38,220 --> 00:59:40,960
has been marked by is the recognition

1304
00:59:40,960 --> 00:59:42,710
that this is a one-way transfer

1305
00:59:43,230 --> 00:59:46,073
from intelligence to
some sort of endpoint.

1306
00:59:46,190 --> 00:59:48,510
Those endpoints have intelligence now,

1307
00:59:48,510 --> 00:59:50,893
and they're being fed
back into the system.

1308
00:59:51,090 --> 00:59:53,100
So whether that is an
operator in the field,

1309
00:59:53,100 --> 00:59:54,500
whether that is a private sector

1310
00:59:54,500 --> 00:59:57,998
that understands a cyber
threat is happening,

1311
00:59:57,998 --> 01:00:02,048
or a company that sees an economic action,

1312
01:00:02,048 --> 01:00:05,310
it's creating this circular
flow of intelligence

1313
01:00:05,310 --> 01:00:08,243
to endpoint back to the main back to it

1314
01:00:08,243 --> 01:00:10,803
that I think is one of the
most different aspects.

1315
01:00:12,245 --> 01:00:13,583
- [Scotty] General Ashley?

1316
01:00:14,050 --> 01:00:15,510
- That's what you were
gonna say, right, Bob?

1317
01:00:15,510 --> 01:00:16,343
- It was.

1318
01:00:16,343 --> 01:00:18,950
And, like Robert, I'm marking off my list.

1319
01:00:19,207 --> 01:00:21,017
I think there's a mindset change,

1320
01:00:21,017 --> 01:00:23,450
and it's reflected in the
National Defense Strategy.

1321
01:00:23,450 --> 01:00:26,967
It is a start, and we'll
iterate our way through it,

1322
01:00:26,967 --> 01:00:29,493
and the mindset is the need to share.

1323
01:00:30,180 --> 01:00:33,100
So in the context of how
are we being more proactive

1324
01:00:33,100 --> 01:00:36,943
as opposed to reactive,
me and my partners,

1325
01:00:36,943 --> 01:00:39,150
that we come back out, I'm
looking at Gary Johnson

1326
01:00:39,150 --> 01:00:41,693
who just came out of Afghanistan.

1327
01:00:41,809 --> 01:00:45,530
When you're in a combat
zone in Afghanistan or Iraq,

1328
01:00:45,530 --> 01:00:49,980
or Syria, you find that you
have a lot more latitude

1329
01:00:49,980 --> 01:00:53,310
to share intelligence, and
you come back to the states

1330
01:00:53,310 --> 01:00:55,090
and you sit down with one of
your partners and go, you know,

1331
01:00:55,090 --> 01:00:56,570
I can share this with
you in a combat zone,

1332
01:00:56,570 --> 01:00:59,323
I can't do anything,
or I'm kind of limited.

1333
01:00:59,509 --> 01:01:02,950
So for me, the mindset that is
in that second line of effort

1334
01:01:02,950 --> 01:01:06,820
that talks about enabling
allies and expanding that

1335
01:01:06,880 --> 01:01:08,883
is a mindset that says,

1336
01:01:08,983 --> 01:01:10,950
let's not wait for the conflict

1337
01:01:10,950 --> 01:01:14,373
to start to start sorting
out what's happening.

1338
01:01:14,693 --> 01:01:17,010
And that mindset is in
that second line of effort,

1339
01:01:17,010 --> 01:01:19,980
which says, hey, let's start
building those coalitions,

1340
01:01:19,980 --> 01:01:22,330
let's start bringing in
non-traditional allies

1341
01:01:22,670 --> 01:01:24,683
into that intel sharing construct,

1342
01:01:25,926 --> 01:01:28,780
and we're gonna have
better placement in access,

1343
01:01:28,780 --> 01:01:30,330
we're gonna better
situational understanding

1344
01:01:30,330 --> 01:01:31,930
of what's taking place globally,

1345
01:01:32,010 --> 01:01:33,900
because so many of those
partners can see and do,

1346
01:01:33,900 --> 01:01:35,070
and understand things.

1347
01:01:35,070 --> 01:01:36,453
Intent, for example.

1348
01:01:37,530 --> 01:01:38,940
I just came back from the Baltics,

1349
01:01:38,940 --> 01:01:41,760
I just spent the last
week with our Lithuanian,

1350
01:01:41,760 --> 01:01:44,950
Latvian and Estonia partners,
and if I wanted to sit down

1351
01:01:44,950 --> 01:01:48,300
and get an understanding
of what's taking place

1352
01:01:48,494 --> 01:01:51,737
in the western military district, boy,

1353
01:01:51,737 --> 01:01:54,043
there's some intellectual
capital right there.

1354
01:01:54,340 --> 01:01:56,590
And for us to have that ability
to be able to share that

1355
01:01:56,590 --> 01:01:57,633
is huge.

1356
01:01:57,920 --> 01:02:01,150
And so, in many ways, we're
pushing on a door that's open.

1357
01:02:01,150 --> 01:02:03,700
There's a little bit of
that Cold War doorstop

1358
01:02:03,700 --> 01:02:06,760
that's kinda stuck that we gotta
push a little bit harder on

1359
01:02:07,370 --> 01:02:09,690
to understand how do we mitigate
the risk as we move ahead.

1360
01:02:09,690 --> 01:02:12,530
The other area I would say
is that we're embracing,

1361
01:02:12,530 --> 01:02:13,870
and there's a lot of work to be done,

1362
01:02:13,870 --> 01:02:15,910
which is in public available information

1363
01:02:15,910 --> 01:02:18,190
or open source intelligence in

1364
01:02:18,190 --> 01:02:19,980
that it doesn't have to be something

1365
01:02:19,980 --> 01:02:21,830
that comes off of a pristine satellite,

1366
01:02:21,830 --> 01:02:25,393
or that has 12 caveats of
classification in front of you.

1367
01:02:25,810 --> 01:02:27,990
As long as you've applied
good analytic trade craft,

1368
01:02:27,990 --> 01:02:29,850
you understand the
source of the information

1369
01:02:29,850 --> 01:02:31,300
and you can tip or queue it

1370
01:02:31,300 --> 01:02:33,233
with other classified information.

1371
01:02:33,580 --> 01:02:37,980
I think that is incredibly
powerful indications and warning

1372
01:02:37,980 --> 01:02:40,330
on a global scale of insights

1373
01:02:40,330 --> 01:02:43,133
that we are just narrowly
beginning to tap into,

1374
01:02:43,145 --> 01:02:45,260
and to be able to do that at scale

1375
01:02:45,260 --> 01:02:47,410
we're gonna need some
pretty good AI tools,

1376
01:02:47,560 --> 01:02:49,383
otherwise we are just gonna drown.

1377
01:02:51,610 --> 01:02:52,610
- [Scotty] Director?

1378
01:02:52,765 --> 01:02:54,483
- Everything my partner said,

1379
01:02:54,960 --> 01:02:57,680
and General Nakasone mentioned

1380
01:02:57,680 --> 01:03:00,493
that feeling on the 12th of
September that we all had,

1381
01:03:00,510 --> 01:03:02,710
actually on the 11th,
'cause it was morning.

1382
01:03:03,147 --> 01:03:07,080
And, I would offer, my position is,

1383
01:03:07,080 --> 01:03:12,080
we collectively had a failure
to imagine planes as weapons

1384
01:03:12,610 --> 01:03:14,760
on the 10th of September,
so we were struck.

1385
01:03:14,760 --> 01:03:16,780
And so our reaction
with what happened to us

1386
01:03:16,780 --> 01:03:21,403
and what do we do next, well,
you shut down air traffic.

1387
01:03:22,340 --> 01:03:24,510
It keeps the next attack from happening

1388
01:03:24,510 --> 01:03:26,130
that happened the morning of the 11th.

1389
01:03:26,130 --> 01:03:29,740
I guess my question,
really, for our panel,

1390
01:03:29,740 --> 01:03:34,163
as we have all made great
progress for 17 years is,

1391
01:03:35,845 --> 01:03:37,943
what will we do next time,

1392
01:03:38,890 --> 01:03:40,923
how much time will we have next time?

1393
01:03:42,170 --> 01:03:43,380
And obviously we want to stop

1394
01:03:43,380 --> 01:03:45,060
everything that we can happening,

1395
01:03:45,060 --> 01:03:47,563
but are we agile enough,

1396
01:03:48,205 --> 01:03:50,790
do we have the imagination
to think through

1397
01:03:50,790 --> 01:03:55,696
how we're going to have
to recreate the security

1398
01:03:55,696 --> 01:03:58,390
if indeed it happens again?

1399
01:03:58,390 --> 01:04:02,910
And so I would just echo that
we've made great progress.

1400
01:04:02,910 --> 01:04:05,560
I was in the community
almost as long before 9/11

1401
01:04:05,560 --> 01:04:07,453
as now I have been after,

1402
01:04:07,730 --> 01:04:11,330
and this is a truly integrated community,

1403
01:04:11,330 --> 01:04:12,680
and not just this panel

1404
01:04:13,000 --> 01:04:15,200
but our industry and
international partners.

1405
01:04:15,890 --> 01:04:19,119
And yet, as soon as we
become comfortable with that

1406
01:04:19,119 --> 01:04:23,170
or complacent, I think we
get into that September 10th

1407
01:04:23,880 --> 01:04:25,513
kind of worry zone.

1408
01:04:26,500 --> 01:04:27,370
- Thanks, sir.

1409
01:04:27,636 --> 01:04:31,960
This next question was
for the Honorable Gordon,

1410
01:04:31,960 --> 01:04:33,901
but I think I'm gonna open it
up a little bit to everybody,

1411
01:04:33,901 --> 01:04:36,351
because I think you will
all have opinions on it.

1412
01:04:37,110 --> 01:04:40,419
So you mention in your remarks
about the opioid crisis

1413
01:04:40,419 --> 01:04:42,483
and transnational crime.

1414
01:04:42,750 --> 01:04:44,233
So the question, really, is,

1415
01:04:44,320 --> 01:04:45,890
I think everybody would agree with you

1416
01:04:45,890 --> 01:04:47,030
those are pretty serious threats.

1417
01:04:47,030 --> 01:04:49,720
What does it take for the
threshold for the nation

1418
01:04:49,720 --> 01:04:53,490
or for the department to add
those to the four plus one,

1419
01:04:53,490 --> 01:04:55,690
two plus three, however
you wanna count that

1420
01:04:55,990 --> 01:04:57,430
and make those official,

1421
01:04:57,430 --> 01:04:59,520
on the books kind of
threats we all talk about

1422
01:04:59,520 --> 01:05:00,870
and start thinking through?

1423
01:05:03,512 --> 01:05:06,027
- Great question, I'll
take the help from my team.

1424
01:05:06,027 --> 01:05:07,640
I'm looking at you, thinking you,

1425
01:05:07,640 --> 01:05:09,653
Kari, so gotta work on this.

1426
01:05:09,700 --> 01:05:11,520
I guess one of the things

1427
01:05:11,523 --> 01:05:13,100
that I think we're in the middle of,

1428
01:05:13,100 --> 01:05:15,000
and it goes a little
bit to Robert's comments

1429
01:05:15,000 --> 01:05:20,000
about imagination, if you look
over the course of my career,

1430
01:05:20,380 --> 01:05:24,880
I think we have really been
a political military threat

1431
01:05:25,572 --> 01:05:26,983
kind of community.

1432
01:05:27,461 --> 01:05:32,461
And you see us now really
focused on economic threats.

1433
01:05:32,553 --> 01:05:34,140
And then, why does this matter?

1434
01:05:34,140 --> 01:05:37,620
'Cause it all is about how
do you go and prosecute

1435
01:05:37,620 --> 01:05:40,140
and find the information that you need

1436
01:05:40,140 --> 01:05:44,533
in order to have wisdom and
insight that allows action.

1437
01:05:45,030 --> 01:05:48,970
So we know where we
would go to find wisdom

1438
01:05:48,970 --> 01:05:52,733
and insight about political
military activities.

1439
01:05:52,780 --> 01:05:56,420
We are learning where we go
to get information and wisdom

1440
01:05:56,420 --> 01:06:00,333
and insight about economic
activities and intent.

1441
01:06:01,220 --> 01:06:04,370
In a very interesting world of constraint

1442
01:06:04,446 --> 01:06:07,240
on what you want government entities to do

1443
01:06:07,240 --> 01:06:10,640
and be able to go, and look,
and I would say the same thing

1444
01:06:10,640 --> 01:06:12,619
with transnational organized crime.

1445
01:06:12,619 --> 01:06:15,777
They used to be able to find
it, to find the nexus for it,

1446
01:06:15,777 --> 01:06:20,240
to be able to devote the
collection resources to go after it

1447
01:06:20,240 --> 01:06:23,250
and to have the expertise
that allows you to understand

1448
01:06:23,500 --> 01:06:25,940
the disparate pieces of information

1449
01:06:26,200 --> 01:06:28,830
and to be able to find the individuals

1450
01:06:28,902 --> 01:06:32,310
different from the
individuals that were involved

1451
01:06:32,310 --> 01:06:35,010
in terrorism in order to be
able to find those networks

1452
01:06:35,010 --> 01:06:35,860
and disrupt them.

1453
01:06:36,520 --> 01:06:37,543
I'm a hopeful gal.

1454
01:06:38,490 --> 01:06:40,954
What the best thing about
the intelligence community

1455
01:06:40,954 --> 01:06:44,710
over my tenure and the
national security community

1456
01:06:44,710 --> 01:06:49,513
is that we have a history
of taking intractable,

1457
01:06:50,500 --> 01:06:53,590
unsolvable problems and solving them.

1458
01:06:53,590 --> 01:06:55,990
In the 1950s, the notion of

1459
01:06:55,990 --> 01:06:59,320
being able to see what
the Soviets was doing

1460
01:06:59,320 --> 01:07:00,650
was beyond our kin,

1461
01:07:00,650 --> 01:07:02,700
and now we have almost transparency.

1462
01:07:02,700 --> 01:07:05,340
So I think it's about
resetting our mindset,

1463
01:07:05,340 --> 01:07:06,410
getting resources

1464
01:07:06,410 --> 01:07:08,510
and being able to understand
where the information is

1465
01:07:08,510 --> 01:07:11,470
and go after and prosecute networks

1466
01:07:11,490 --> 01:07:13,240
that are different from the networks

1467
01:07:13,240 --> 01:07:14,687
that we've seen here before.

1468
01:07:15,685 --> 01:07:17,993
- [Scotty] Any other
thoughts from the panelists?

1469
01:07:18,120 --> 01:07:22,390
- [Bob] So I'd say, losing
72,000, if that was the number--

1470
01:07:22,390 --> 01:07:23,510
- Yep, last year.

1471
01:07:23,510 --> 01:07:24,718
- Of our citizens

1472
01:07:24,718 --> 01:07:28,340
is something that will gather
the attention of the nation,

1473
01:07:28,340 --> 01:07:31,710
I would hope, depending
on how that is promulgated

1474
01:07:31,710 --> 01:07:32,883
and how it's moved out.

1475
01:07:33,260 --> 01:07:34,820
The other part of this is, we think about,

1476
01:07:34,820 --> 01:07:37,723
even in the context of drawing
a parallel and CT threat,

1477
01:07:37,883 --> 01:07:40,160
the foundation of the CT issues

1478
01:07:40,350 --> 01:07:41,650
have to do with ungoverned space,

1479
01:07:41,650 --> 01:07:42,800
they have to do with economics,

1480
01:07:42,800 --> 01:07:45,190
they have to do with
the inability to employ

1481
01:07:45,540 --> 01:07:48,945
a bulge of youth that don't have jobs,

1482
01:07:48,945 --> 01:07:50,380
that don't have a sense of a future.

1483
01:07:50,380 --> 01:07:52,791
So when you think about
transnational crime,

1484
01:07:52,791 --> 01:07:56,103
and the opioids and other
things along those lines,

1485
01:07:56,380 --> 01:08:00,460
I think what the IC can do is
can help illuminate it and,

1486
01:08:00,460 --> 01:08:01,670
much kind of like we talk about

1487
01:08:01,670 --> 01:08:04,960
in the context of what the military

1488
01:08:04,960 --> 01:08:07,730
can do on some of the CT issues is

1489
01:08:07,730 --> 01:08:09,623
we can buy you space and time.

1490
01:08:11,035 --> 01:08:13,150
We can mitigate to a degree the threat,

1491
01:08:13,150 --> 01:08:18,060
but we can't solve it, and
that really is whole of nations

1492
01:08:18,120 --> 01:08:19,700
to look at transnational crimes,

1493
01:08:19,700 --> 01:08:20,880
so the military can get after it

1494
01:08:20,880 --> 01:08:24,284
because we have capacity,
we have the technology,

1495
01:08:24,284 --> 01:08:26,887
and we solve these kinds of problems,

1496
01:08:26,887 --> 01:08:30,290
but really it's binding space and time.

1497
01:08:30,290 --> 01:08:33,040
It will not get down to the
fundamental issue of drug abuse

1498
01:08:33,040 --> 01:08:35,113
and or criminality.

1499
01:08:36,260 --> 01:08:39,223
- So I would offer to
those really good thoughts,

1500
01:08:40,680 --> 01:08:43,283
first of all, the idea of,
there is some threshold.

1501
01:08:43,340 --> 01:08:45,540
There are existential
threats to our nation,

1502
01:08:45,663 --> 01:08:49,070
and we're a global power, and
we will certainly have areas

1503
01:08:49,070 --> 01:08:51,330
where we're going to have
to address the opiate crisis

1504
01:08:51,330 --> 01:08:54,223
and other type of different
crises that we will face.

1505
01:08:54,390 --> 01:08:56,311
The idea of two oceans protecting
our nation well went out

1506
01:08:56,311 --> 01:08:58,403
seven decades ago.

1507
01:08:58,810 --> 01:09:00,760
But if we do think about the threshold,

1508
01:09:00,760 --> 01:09:03,520
if the two in the
strategic power competition

1509
01:09:03,520 --> 01:09:04,870
are so critical, it's really

1510
01:09:04,870 --> 01:09:06,050
because of the criticality

1511
01:09:06,050 --> 01:09:08,360
of the nature of their existential threat

1512
01:09:08,360 --> 01:09:09,820
to he United States

1513
01:09:09,820 --> 01:09:13,773
and their ability to be able
to cause and do us harm.

1514
01:09:15,004 --> 01:09:15,927
- If I can also add,

1515
01:09:15,927 --> 01:09:19,610
I'm gonna steal a sheep from
General Ashley's talking points

1516
01:09:19,610 --> 01:09:21,373
earlier, and it's on coalitions.

1517
01:09:22,844 --> 01:09:25,520
I had an opportunity to
engage recently with Southcom

1518
01:09:25,520 --> 01:09:26,500
with their two there,

1519
01:09:26,500 --> 01:09:28,600
and also with some
South American partners.

1520
01:09:28,600 --> 01:09:31,338
There's some tremendous
capacity access capability

1521
01:09:31,338 --> 01:09:35,600
that they have, and for us,
this is a zero sum game.

1522
01:09:35,600 --> 01:09:38,179
As we look to implement the NDS,

1523
01:09:38,179 --> 01:09:43,179
we are going to have to shift
some of our capabilities

1524
01:09:44,400 --> 01:09:49,070
and assets, but we have strong
coalition partners that,

1525
01:09:49,070 --> 01:09:51,787
if I look at this from a
sum of the parts equation,

1526
01:09:51,787 --> 01:09:54,910
bringing them in, being
interoperable, integrating,

1527
01:09:54,910 --> 01:09:57,691
sharing intelligence, sharing capacity,

1528
01:09:57,691 --> 01:09:59,340
there's a tremendous amount

1529
01:09:59,340 --> 01:10:03,053
that we can collectively do
together to get after this.

1530
01:10:03,390 --> 01:10:04,240
- And if I could,

1531
01:10:04,280 --> 01:10:06,100
having been down to see
Admiral Studeman recently,

1532
01:10:06,100 --> 01:10:08,300
and I'm sure Miss Bingen
would echo this is,

1533
01:10:08,460 --> 01:10:10,610
because they're not one of the COCOMs

1534
01:10:10,610 --> 01:10:13,700
that has lamellate resources,

1535
01:10:13,700 --> 01:10:15,954
they have been incredibly innovative

1536
01:10:15,954 --> 01:10:17,680
in the assets they have.

1537
01:10:17,680 --> 01:10:19,310
So they're doing a lot
to solve the problems

1538
01:10:19,310 --> 01:10:21,260
internal to the resources they do have.

1539
01:10:22,103 --> 01:10:23,012
- Good point.

1540
01:10:23,012 --> 01:10:23,979
- [Scotty] Great, I think we'll move

1541
01:10:23,979 --> 01:10:25,853
into the individual questions.

1542
01:10:25,905 --> 01:10:27,803
Director Cardillo, you're first.

1543
01:10:29,050 --> 01:10:32,510
Please discuss how NGA is buying,

1544
01:10:32,510 --> 01:10:35,480
and I'll add using
commercial satellite imagery,

1545
01:10:35,480 --> 01:10:38,863
and what are the changes
planned to attract new vendors?

1546
01:10:41,187 --> 01:10:44,480
- It refers to the
reality that I described.

1547
01:10:44,480 --> 01:10:45,830
The government at one point

1548
01:10:45,850 --> 01:10:50,467
had near exclusive access
to space, and that changed,

1549
01:10:50,467 --> 01:10:51,723
and I already made the point

1550
01:10:51,723 --> 01:10:55,240
that I think it changed in a
very good way economically,

1551
01:10:55,240 --> 01:10:57,223
socially, culturally, et cetera.

1552
01:10:57,770 --> 01:10:59,843
What NGA's doing now, and by the way,

1553
01:11:00,200 --> 01:11:03,150
this question is more with my
functional management hat on.

1554
01:11:04,057 --> 01:11:08,077
With that hat on, I'm mandated to seek

1555
01:11:09,470 --> 01:11:12,320
as much capability as possible

1556
01:11:12,320 --> 01:11:15,560
to answer the prioritized
needs of those that we serve,

1557
01:11:15,560 --> 01:11:18,966
and so one way to do that most efficiently

1558
01:11:18,966 --> 01:11:22,930
is to leverage commercial capabilities

1559
01:11:22,930 --> 01:11:24,423
to the extent that we can.

1560
01:11:25,140 --> 01:11:28,069
And the idea, the philosophy, then, is,

1561
01:11:28,069 --> 01:11:31,280
if we can grow that commercial foundation,

1562
01:11:31,280 --> 01:11:35,853
if we can acquire or gain access
to that growing capability,

1563
01:11:36,111 --> 01:11:40,920
the government can then focus its assets

1564
01:11:40,920 --> 01:11:44,223
on more exquisite or more
exclusive capabilities.

1565
01:11:44,710 --> 01:11:47,490
And so we have been a long term partner

1566
01:11:47,530 --> 01:11:51,763
of the commercial imagery
industry that continues to grow,

1567
01:11:52,090 --> 01:11:55,150
and we're an equally long term,

1568
01:11:55,150 --> 01:11:58,630
or even a longer term partner
with my mission partner

1569
01:11:58,630 --> 01:12:00,700
at the National Reconnaissance Office.

1570
01:12:00,700 --> 01:12:05,700
So those two capabilities have
always been complementary,

1571
01:12:05,957 --> 01:12:10,040
the opportunity we have now
though is to, if you will,

1572
01:12:10,040 --> 01:12:11,730
move up that capability scale

1573
01:12:11,730 --> 01:12:14,130
on top of a growing
commercial imagery industry.

1574
01:12:16,880 --> 01:12:19,163
- [Scotty] Okay, the next one goes to,

1575
01:12:19,527 --> 01:12:21,551
I think it's a combination
of General Ashley

1576
01:12:21,551 --> 01:12:22,760
and The Honorable Bingen,

1577
01:12:22,760 --> 01:12:25,060
so you may want to dive
into this one as well.

1578
01:12:25,230 --> 01:12:26,500
Given our limited resources,

1579
01:12:26,500 --> 01:12:28,910
how do we maintain all source competency

1580
01:12:29,260 --> 01:12:31,260
across many regions and disciplines

1581
01:12:31,260 --> 01:12:34,493
beyond just the two plus
three slash four plus one?

1582
01:12:35,219 --> 01:12:36,693
General Ashley, over to you.

1583
01:12:37,523 --> 01:12:40,106
(Sue laughing)

1584
01:12:40,110 --> 01:12:41,310
- Such an easy question.

1585
01:12:43,357 --> 01:12:45,370
It becomes a risk calculus.

1586
01:12:45,370 --> 01:12:47,720
So you go back to the
National Defense Strategy,

1587
01:12:47,720 --> 01:12:49,090
and General Nakasone alluded this,

1588
01:12:49,090 --> 01:12:50,740
what are the existential threats?

1589
01:12:50,860 --> 01:12:54,340
So even as a nation,
given all the hard work

1590
01:12:54,340 --> 01:12:55,650
and all of us in part

1591
01:12:56,190 --> 01:12:58,830
with the CT fighter
over the last 17 years,

1592
01:12:58,830 --> 01:13:02,010
we see emergence of
great power competition

1593
01:13:02,010 --> 01:13:04,350
which is gonna cause us, to a degree,

1594
01:13:04,350 --> 01:13:07,396
to rebalance part of those resources

1595
01:13:07,396 --> 01:13:09,893
to be able to look at China and Russia,

1596
01:13:09,893 --> 01:13:11,290
and, to a lesser degree,

1597
01:13:11,290 --> 01:13:13,940
where Iran and North Korea
and violet extremists are.

1598
01:13:14,010 --> 01:13:15,910
We've gotten very very good

1599
01:13:16,490 --> 01:13:19,737
at how we work against violent
extremist organizations.

1600
01:13:19,737 --> 01:13:22,418
It is incredible what
has been accomplished

1601
01:13:22,418 --> 01:13:24,713
over the last couple of decades.

1602
01:13:25,330 --> 01:13:27,690
Very interesting where we were on 9/11

1603
01:13:27,690 --> 01:13:31,170
having seen part of that task force

1604
01:13:31,200 --> 01:13:33,150
that has dealt with that
over the last 17 years,

1605
01:13:33,150 --> 01:13:35,462
where it was in terms of capability.

1606
01:13:35,462 --> 01:13:39,613
And the chief talks about this,
as do other senior leaders,

1607
01:13:39,900 --> 01:13:44,830
our ability to engage in
major combat operations

1608
01:13:45,490 --> 01:13:47,910
is something that is growing
that we're having to build.

1609
01:13:47,910 --> 01:13:49,560
But when you look at those resources,

1610
01:13:49,560 --> 01:13:53,223
it really is, there's something of a cap.

1611
01:13:53,230 --> 01:13:56,230
And so, we gotta look at what
is the real existential threat

1612
01:13:56,620 --> 01:14:01,620
that, if you don't succeed on day one,

1613
01:14:02,014 --> 01:14:03,623
you don't get a day two.

1614
01:14:04,690 --> 01:14:06,380
And so, for us as we look at that,

1615
01:14:06,380 --> 01:14:08,553
China and Russia are those kinds of,

1616
01:14:08,628 --> 01:14:11,270
if you don't win on day one,
you may not get a day two.

1617
01:14:11,270 --> 01:14:13,420
So we're just having to
look at how we reallocate.

1618
01:14:13,420 --> 01:14:14,720
The other part of that is,

1619
01:14:14,760 --> 01:14:17,196
how do we build that expertise
that we had within the IC

1620
01:14:17,196 --> 01:14:19,600
that really understood
how the Soviets thought

1621
01:14:20,010 --> 01:14:21,590
and other nation states

1622
01:14:21,690 --> 01:14:24,740
as they got divested into other areas.

1623
01:14:24,740 --> 01:14:26,280
So part of what we're working on now is,

1624
01:14:26,280 --> 01:14:28,539
how do we build those Russia SMEs,

1625
01:14:28,539 --> 01:14:32,687
how do we build depth into
the bench that we have

1626
01:14:32,687 --> 01:14:35,683
for some of those existential
nuclear threats because,

1627
01:14:35,860 --> 01:14:36,693
at the end of the day,

1628
01:14:36,693 --> 01:14:39,230
is understanding that decision calculus

1629
01:14:39,347 --> 01:14:43,280
and how they are going to
put that strategy in place

1630
01:14:43,420 --> 01:14:47,063
that's gonna give decision
advantage to our assimilators.

1631
01:14:50,350 --> 01:14:51,750
- I'll jump on that as well.

1632
01:14:53,210 --> 01:14:55,660
If everything's a priority,
nothing's a priority.

1633
01:14:55,670 --> 01:14:57,973
So we do have to think
in terms of priorities,

1634
01:14:58,040 --> 01:15:00,473
but I'll echo what some
have said already here.

1635
01:15:02,250 --> 01:15:04,470
We need to be thinking broader

1636
01:15:04,470 --> 01:15:07,670
than just what an
intelligence community person

1637
01:15:07,670 --> 01:15:10,510
or US government or US person can provide

1638
01:15:10,720 --> 01:15:12,100
in terms of duty to warn,

1639
01:15:12,100 --> 01:15:15,453
in terms of preventing the
next strategic surprise.

1640
01:15:15,490 --> 01:15:18,100
We have phenomenal a ta
shays around the world,

1641
01:15:18,100 --> 01:15:21,160
we have phenomenal
coalition partners, again,

1642
01:15:21,160 --> 01:15:24,513
the bench just doesn't have to
be filled by US folks alone,

1643
01:15:24,513 --> 01:15:28,633
and open source, which General
Ashley mentioned earlier.

1644
01:15:28,725 --> 01:15:30,820
Tremendous amount of open source data,

1645
01:15:30,820 --> 01:15:33,560
but then we've gotta have
the big data, the analytics,

1646
01:15:33,560 --> 01:15:35,310
the machine learning, the AI pieces

1647
01:15:35,370 --> 01:15:37,620
to make sure that that
information is useful

1648
01:15:37,690 --> 01:15:40,823
to get after those strategic
surprise kind of challenges.

1649
01:15:42,223 --> 01:15:45,540
- Yeah, so I'll pick up

1650
01:15:45,540 --> 01:15:46,473
where Kari ended.

1651
01:15:46,860 --> 01:15:51,830
I'm a hopeless romantic about
what data can do for it.

1652
01:15:51,830 --> 01:15:54,573
We have to be able to
command it, it is abundant.

1653
01:15:55,513 --> 01:15:58,880
I can imagine the ability for machines

1654
01:15:58,880 --> 01:16:02,240
to help us find patterns
in massive amounts of data

1655
01:16:02,240 --> 01:16:04,023
that we cat here to four.

1656
01:16:04,410 --> 01:16:07,800
We have a tremendous
intelligence community,

1657
01:16:07,800 --> 01:16:11,380
but we have many officers
who are doing manual things

1658
01:16:11,380 --> 01:16:13,283
that don't have to be doing those.

1659
01:16:13,560 --> 01:16:17,513
I think if you have enough
data you can infer intent.

1660
01:16:17,928 --> 01:16:20,710
So if you ask me what I
intend to do this weekend,

1661
01:16:20,710 --> 01:16:21,770
I may give you one answer.

1662
01:16:21,770 --> 01:16:24,720
If you look at all the
data of my easy pass

1663
01:16:24,720 --> 01:16:27,120
on what I do every
weekend and where I drive,

1664
01:16:27,120 --> 01:16:28,840
you are going to probably know

1665
01:16:28,840 --> 01:16:30,290
what I'm actually going to do,

1666
01:16:30,290 --> 01:16:31,480
perhaps even more.

1667
01:16:31,480 --> 01:16:35,220
One, I believe that we will, we must,

1668
01:16:35,220 --> 01:16:36,500
we can get to the point,

1669
01:16:36,500 --> 01:16:40,283
that we're able to see much
more of the world's happenings,

1670
01:16:41,150 --> 01:16:45,890
to pick up on my panel's
comments about imagination.

1671
01:16:45,890 --> 01:16:48,880
I think, however, it will
test us to not be stodgy

1672
01:16:48,880 --> 01:16:52,823
about what out understanding
of those activities is.

1673
01:16:54,048 --> 01:16:56,210
I said when I started the technology

1674
01:16:56,210 --> 01:17:01,210
in ubiquitous connectivity
changes what people can do.

1675
01:17:01,450 --> 01:17:04,380
We cannot afford to be
assessing the activities we see

1676
01:17:04,380 --> 01:17:06,840
with a mindset that we have.

1677
01:17:06,840 --> 01:17:09,983
So many of us, I'm old,

1678
01:17:10,024 --> 01:17:13,250
so I remember the Soviet production model.

1679
01:17:13,250 --> 01:17:17,680
That is not the way production
has to happen anymore.

1680
01:17:17,680 --> 01:17:20,363
With advanced manufacturing,
new materials,

1681
01:17:20,580 --> 01:17:23,100
acquisition of knowledge,
ubiquitous computing,

1682
01:17:23,100 --> 01:17:25,143
things can happen so much faster.

1683
01:17:25,300 --> 01:17:29,413
In a world of cyber where
things can be influenced,

1684
01:17:30,270 --> 01:17:32,130
and so what you see in terms of election

1685
01:17:32,130 --> 01:17:35,220
is not in fact what's happening in that.

1686
01:17:35,220 --> 01:17:39,490
So even as we have the ability
to see the world more clearly

1687
01:17:39,490 --> 01:17:43,470
when data and machine learning
comes into play, we as humans

1688
01:17:43,470 --> 01:17:47,220
are going to have to open out minds again

1689
01:17:48,960 --> 01:17:52,984
to look at what we're seeing
and assess it differently

1690
01:17:52,984 --> 01:17:55,823
than against some pattern that we knew,

1691
01:17:56,280 --> 01:17:59,633
because this is as different
a world as I have ever seen.

1692
01:18:01,284 --> 01:18:02,363
- [Scotty] Thank you.

1693
01:18:02,450 --> 01:18:03,283
Bob, go ahead.

1694
01:18:03,283 --> 01:18:05,243
- Yeah, just one more
followup on that one.

1695
01:18:05,750 --> 01:18:08,380
I had a senior leader a couple
years ago ask me a question,

1696
01:18:08,380 --> 01:18:11,940
and he said, how do you
detect the faint signals,

1697
01:18:11,940 --> 01:18:16,940
the winds of war, that conflict
is coming on a global scale?

1698
01:18:17,347 --> 01:18:20,300
And I went, I'll get back
with you close of business,

1699
01:18:20,300 --> 01:18:22,050
I will have that answer for you.

1700
01:18:22,530 --> 01:18:24,480
So think about the data
and all the information

1701
01:18:24,480 --> 01:18:25,333
that's out there.

1702
01:18:25,890 --> 01:18:26,850
And then, even though

1703
01:18:26,850 --> 01:18:30,020
as the defense intelligence
agency across the dime

1704
01:18:30,020 --> 01:18:32,513
we have to go very very deep into the M,

1705
01:18:33,010 --> 01:18:34,810
I have to be cognizant of what's happening

1706
01:18:34,810 --> 01:18:36,753
in the D, the I, and the E.

1707
01:18:37,490 --> 01:18:41,140
So imagine it's July 1914

1708
01:18:41,565 --> 01:18:44,115
and you had all the tools
that are out there today.

1709
01:18:45,466 --> 01:18:46,723
What was knowable?

1710
01:18:47,530 --> 01:18:50,073
Could you have avoided World War I?

1711
01:18:50,636 --> 01:18:54,653
Was that information
discernible, or was it hidden?

1712
01:18:55,250 --> 01:18:56,680
And so, I think as we start looking

1713
01:18:56,680 --> 01:18:58,820
at how we aggregate
those kinds of insights

1714
01:18:58,820 --> 01:19:01,350
on a global scale, you start
watching what's happening

1715
01:19:01,350 --> 01:19:05,620
in various nations across
diplomatic information, military,

1716
01:19:05,620 --> 01:19:09,920
and economic moves, and a lot
of times that information,

1717
01:19:09,920 --> 01:19:11,480
because of how you file contracts,

1718
01:19:11,480 --> 01:19:14,883
how you work with other nation
states, is discoverable.

1719
01:19:15,384 --> 01:19:16,523
And so you start looking

1720
01:19:16,523 --> 01:19:19,923
and you start getting an idea
of moves that may happen,

1721
01:19:20,840 --> 01:19:24,763
and you get left to that, in time,

1722
01:19:24,890 --> 01:19:26,440
to give you decision advantage.

1723
01:19:27,050 --> 01:19:31,202
And in some cases, and the
Honorable Gordon alluded to this,

1724
01:19:31,202 --> 01:19:35,010
I think it was a book that
General Thomas had recommended.

1725
01:19:35,010 --> 01:19:37,410
And they had an acronym,
it was called the HPPO.

1726
01:19:37,410 --> 01:19:40,530
It was the Highly Paid
Professional Opinion,

1727
01:19:40,530 --> 01:19:42,303
in other words, kind of the CEO.

1728
01:19:42,572 --> 01:19:44,420
And, over time, it was showing

1729
01:19:44,420 --> 01:19:45,610
that the artificial intelligence

1730
01:19:45,610 --> 01:19:47,840
actually had better decision capability

1731
01:19:48,000 --> 01:19:53,000
than some of those senior
leaders and their intuition.

1732
01:19:53,530 --> 01:19:55,030
So it's an interesting dynamic

1733
01:19:55,290 --> 01:20:00,007
to the degree that we can
take and balance what we see

1734
01:20:00,007 --> 01:20:02,810
aggregated by artificial intelligence,

1735
01:20:02,810 --> 01:20:06,013
but at the same time, still
applying good judgment.

1736
01:20:07,767 --> 01:20:10,417
- [Scotty] Okay, this one
is for the Director of DIA,

1737
01:20:10,569 --> 01:20:12,235
and--
- I just answered a question.

1738
01:20:12,235 --> 01:20:14,860
- [Scotty] I'm gonna ask you
to channel the Joint Staff J2

1739
01:20:14,860 --> 01:20:16,560
and get somewhat operational here.

1740
01:20:17,030 --> 01:20:19,220
Can you describe how the
Russian threat has evolved

1741
01:20:19,220 --> 01:20:21,135
in the Middle East and
Europe over the past year--

1742
01:20:21,135 --> 01:20:21,968
- [Sue] Oh my goodness.

1743
01:20:21,968 --> 01:20:24,020
- [Scotty] And what are
you anticipating into 2019?

1744
01:20:24,710 --> 01:20:28,913
- I will give you part of that answer.

1745
01:20:29,051 --> 01:20:31,280
The good thing is it allows us to see

1746
01:20:31,280 --> 01:20:33,173
how they're using some of their kit.

1747
01:20:34,420 --> 01:20:37,110
One of the things we've
watched closely over the last

1748
01:20:39,030 --> 01:20:42,923
decade plus is how they
have learned from us,

1749
01:20:43,920 --> 01:20:47,050
how they've organized
around our lessons learned.

1750
01:20:47,050 --> 01:20:50,380
They went to a BTC centric
because we went BTC centric

1751
01:20:50,780 --> 01:20:52,623
and that's how we did the CT fight.

1752
01:20:53,340 --> 01:20:54,640
And then, as we started to think our way

1753
01:20:54,640 --> 01:20:56,610
through great power competition,

1754
01:20:56,610 --> 01:20:58,640
the Army started asking its questions of,

1755
01:20:58,640 --> 01:21:01,440
I probably need to think about
how I'd fight a division.

1756
01:21:02,078 --> 01:21:04,790
So the Russians started
thinking about reorganizing of,

1757
01:21:04,790 --> 01:21:06,163
how do I fight a division?

1758
01:21:06,300 --> 01:21:08,903
At the same time, they're
going through modernization.

1759
01:21:08,970 --> 01:21:11,110
Some of that modernization
is new equipment,

1760
01:21:11,110 --> 01:21:12,210
some of that modernization

1761
01:21:12,210 --> 01:21:14,570
is nothing more than adding better optics

1762
01:21:14,570 --> 01:21:19,430
and weapons to existing frames
of things that they have.

1763
01:21:19,430 --> 01:21:21,080
So what we've been able to do

1764
01:21:21,420 --> 01:21:24,350
is get a sense of some
of the new equipment,

1765
01:21:24,350 --> 01:21:26,703
some of the capability
as they've deployed it,

1766
01:21:27,110 --> 01:21:29,210
obviously what they're doing on the ground

1767
01:21:29,240 --> 01:21:32,120
is not indicative of
major combat operations,

1768
01:21:32,120 --> 01:21:33,830
and so we watch them closely

1769
01:21:33,830 --> 01:21:36,680
when they do exercise Zapad or Vostok,

1770
01:21:36,680 --> 01:21:39,340
which has just completed,
so that we can have insights

1771
01:21:39,340 --> 01:21:41,663
into how they're evolving their doctrine,

1772
01:21:41,970 --> 01:21:45,453
how they do mobilization,
how they alert forces.

1773
01:21:45,819 --> 01:21:48,370
'cause the one thing that the chairman

1774
01:21:48,500 --> 01:21:52,526
will challenge us to do and
challenge the Joint Staff J2 is,

1775
01:21:52,526 --> 01:21:55,100
I'm not concerned about numbers.

1776
01:21:55,100 --> 01:21:56,280
Don't tell me they have six of these,

1777
01:21:56,280 --> 01:21:57,963
seven of those, 12 of those.

1778
01:21:58,820 --> 01:21:59,970
Tell me how I beat 'em.

1779
01:22:00,900 --> 01:22:02,583
Tell me how they're gonna fight it.

1780
01:22:04,430 --> 01:22:06,060
How are they gonna operationalize it?

1781
01:22:06,060 --> 01:22:07,560
Which goes back to my comment,

1782
01:22:07,630 --> 01:22:08,870
what's the context in which

1783
01:22:08,870 --> 01:22:10,520
they're gonna use that technology

1784
01:22:10,850 --> 01:22:13,000
and how are they gonna
deploy their forces.

1785
01:22:13,170 --> 01:22:14,793
- [Scotty] Anyone else wanna pile on that?

1786
01:22:15,003 --> 01:22:17,254
- I think that General Ashley

1787
01:22:17,254 --> 01:22:19,263
has a number of really good points.

1788
01:22:19,350 --> 01:22:21,632
We watch Vostok with
great interest this year.

1789
01:22:21,632 --> 01:22:23,410
We saw what they were
doing in the Eastern Med,

1790
01:22:23,410 --> 01:22:27,965
we saw what they were doing
as far east as Vladivostok,

1791
01:22:27,965 --> 01:22:30,965
and I think we took a number
of different lessons from that.

1792
01:22:32,040 --> 01:22:36,920
This is not a 10 foot
giant, this is a nation

1793
01:22:36,920 --> 01:22:40,700
that is trying to put together
combined arms capabilities.

1794
01:22:40,700 --> 01:22:44,373
And so I think, at least from
the perspective that we had,

1795
01:22:45,270 --> 01:22:47,520
we saw that they were very interested

1796
01:22:47,520 --> 01:22:48,870
in being able to project their power.

1797
01:22:48,870 --> 01:22:51,450
They were very interested in
looking at different partners

1798
01:22:51,450 --> 01:22:54,140
in terms of how do they
operate in the future together.

1799
01:22:54,140 --> 01:22:56,180
And for us it was like, okay, good.

1800
01:22:56,180 --> 01:22:57,863
We understand that better now.

1801
01:22:58,360 --> 01:22:59,320
But I would also offer

1802
01:22:59,320 --> 01:23:01,720
that we continue to watch
around the entire region.

1803
01:23:01,720 --> 01:23:06,720
What is their interest growing
into time here with Syria?

1804
01:23:07,080 --> 01:23:09,310
What is their interest
in places like Tajikastan

1805
01:23:09,310 --> 01:23:12,047
and the northern elements of Afghanistan,

1806
01:23:12,047 --> 01:23:14,159
and how are they gonna
operate in the future?

1807
01:23:14,159 --> 01:23:16,460
We take that with great seriousness

1808
01:23:16,460 --> 01:23:18,020
and watch it very very carefully.

1809
01:23:18,020 --> 01:23:21,913
- In many ways, I've had it
described as a global spoiler.

1810
01:23:22,621 --> 01:23:24,287
And what their presence look into this

1811
01:23:24,287 --> 01:23:26,050
in the great power competition,

1812
01:23:26,050 --> 01:23:27,603
he wants a seat at the table.

1813
01:23:27,990 --> 01:23:30,223
And so, where they can be that spoiler,

1814
01:23:30,580 --> 01:23:34,150
where they can displace us, be more agile,

1815
01:23:34,150 --> 01:23:35,660
whether it's in military cells

1816
01:23:35,660 --> 01:23:38,053
or other aspects of
relationships with nations.

1817
01:23:38,400 --> 01:23:41,070
As you see with China in
terms of economic underpinning

1818
01:23:41,070 --> 01:23:43,173
and support, they will attempt to do that.

1819
01:23:43,720 --> 01:23:45,480
- But I also think, I
would also offer to that

1820
01:23:45,480 --> 01:23:47,450
that very heartened over the past week

1821
01:23:47,450 --> 01:23:49,340
to see our partners and ourselves

1822
01:23:49,340 --> 01:23:51,194
call out the brazen behavior

1823
01:23:51,194 --> 01:23:54,514
and the ability for us to call
out what the GRA was doing

1824
01:23:54,514 --> 01:23:57,633
so brazenly in places
like the Netherlands.

1825
01:23:57,890 --> 01:23:59,100
I'm sure that,

1826
01:23:59,100 --> 01:24:01,940
from the perspective of
what collective we did,

1827
01:24:01,940 --> 01:24:04,350
that has an impact on
their abilities there,

1828
01:24:04,350 --> 01:24:06,050
and very very pleased to see that.

1829
01:24:06,070 --> 01:24:07,750
- [Bob] So the ability to illuminate that

1830
01:24:07,750 --> 01:24:08,900
is absolutely critical.

1831
01:24:10,310 --> 01:24:11,660
- [Scotty] Okay, thank you.

1832
01:24:11,795 --> 01:24:13,763
This one is for General Nakasone.

1833
01:24:14,080 --> 01:24:14,980
Two part question.

1834
01:24:15,780 --> 01:24:17,970
What do you think is the cyber threat

1835
01:24:17,970 --> 01:24:21,333
to tactical mission command
systems, that's part one.

1836
01:24:22,170 --> 01:24:23,360
Would these systems

1837
01:24:23,360 --> 01:24:27,210
really be the targets of the
threat cyber capabilities

1838
01:24:27,210 --> 01:24:29,560
during conflicts, or do you think

1839
01:24:29,870 --> 01:24:32,570
threats would focus their cyber attacks

1840
01:24:32,670 --> 01:24:35,193
on more operational or strategic targets?

1841
01:24:35,320 --> 01:24:37,173
- So the second question, yes.

1842
01:24:37,700 --> 01:24:38,980
They'll focus on anything

1843
01:24:38,980 --> 01:24:42,033
that they're looking to have an impact on.

1844
01:24:42,080 --> 01:24:44,023
Strategic, tactical, operational.

1845
01:24:44,060 --> 01:24:44,893
We're seeing this

1846
01:24:44,893 --> 01:24:47,963
in terms of some of our
adversaries' capabilities.

1847
01:24:48,100 --> 01:24:51,160
But in terms of what we're
looking at for our own forces,

1848
01:24:51,160 --> 01:24:53,177
brigade combat teams, take
a look at what we're doing

1849
01:24:53,177 --> 01:24:55,160
in places like the
National Training Center,

1850
01:24:55,160 --> 01:24:58,770
where we are looking to
get ahead of an adversary

1851
01:24:58,770 --> 01:25:01,033
that is leveraging social media,

1852
01:25:01,036 --> 01:25:04,420
or an adversary that
is attempting to impact

1853
01:25:04,420 --> 01:25:06,853
the infrastructure
within a town or a city.

1854
01:25:07,155 --> 01:25:08,900
Our challenge, I would offer,

1855
01:25:08,900 --> 01:25:11,740
is not necessarily gonna
be the capabilities,

1856
01:25:11,740 --> 01:25:13,500
but being within the capability

1857
01:25:13,500 --> 01:25:15,963
of the decision loop of our adversary.

1858
01:25:16,185 --> 01:25:20,363
Can se recognize, can we
react, can we respond?

1859
01:25:20,780 --> 01:25:22,520
Can we have an impact on an adversary

1860
01:25:22,520 --> 01:25:23,950
that's thinking so rapidly

1861
01:25:24,290 --> 01:25:27,513
in such a shortened amount of time?

1862
01:25:27,991 --> 01:25:31,510
I think we can, and what
I would offer is that,

1863
01:25:31,510 --> 01:25:33,840
what I've seen to date is that

1864
01:25:33,840 --> 01:25:35,850
these exercises that we've been able to do

1865
01:25:35,850 --> 01:25:38,450
over a period of the past 18 months

1866
01:25:39,040 --> 01:25:42,770
have taught our forces a
tremendous amount of wherewithal

1867
01:25:42,770 --> 01:25:45,593
in terms of how do we
do the collection plan.

1868
01:25:45,830 --> 01:25:48,230
How do we call for the right capabilities

1869
01:25:48,230 --> 01:25:49,993
to be brought to the tactical edge?

1870
01:25:50,230 --> 01:25:51,150
Most importantly,

1871
01:25:51,150 --> 01:25:55,900
how do our commanders
visualize this virtual space

1872
01:25:55,900 --> 01:25:57,150
that they're gonna have to talk about?

1873
01:25:57,150 --> 01:26:00,000
And so this is what I
would offer General Berrier

1874
01:26:00,230 --> 01:26:02,080
for us in the tactical realm

1875
01:26:02,080 --> 01:26:04,463
something that will be
most important to us.

1876
01:26:04,840 --> 01:26:06,843
- [Scotty] Thank you, anyone
else wanna pile on that?

1877
01:26:08,070 --> 01:26:11,453
General Nakasone, that really
gets you another question.

1878
01:26:11,840 --> 01:26:12,673
Sorry about that.

1879
01:26:12,673 --> 01:26:13,940
- I feel like General Ashley.

1880
01:26:14,380 --> 01:26:16,760
- [Scotty] If our
enemies seek to attack us

1881
01:26:16,760 --> 01:26:19,263
below the threshold of military activity,

1882
01:26:19,510 --> 01:26:22,170
do our rules of engagement
allow us to counter this threat

1883
01:26:22,170 --> 01:26:24,843
in cyber, both offensively
and defensively?

1884
01:26:25,500 --> 01:26:26,400
- I think they do.

1885
01:26:26,400 --> 01:26:29,160
I think that we've made
tremendous progress

1886
01:26:29,160 --> 01:26:31,900
in terms of how do we think
about, how do we enable,

1887
01:26:31,900 --> 01:26:33,063
again, our partners,

1888
01:26:33,270 --> 01:26:35,290
partners like the Department
of Homeland Security,

1889
01:26:35,290 --> 01:26:36,590
the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

1890
01:26:36,590 --> 01:26:37,840
other government partners

1891
01:26:38,420 --> 01:26:41,160
to ensure that such things as
our critical infrastructure

1892
01:26:41,160 --> 01:26:42,083
is well protected.

1893
01:26:42,520 --> 01:26:45,264
And in terms of what we are
gonna do against our adversaries

1894
01:26:45,264 --> 01:26:48,490
to act, that comes down to the
things that we've been doing

1895
01:26:48,490 --> 01:26:49,370
for many many years.

1896
01:26:49,370 --> 01:26:50,203
Whether or not

1897
01:26:50,598 --> 01:26:52,720
it's computer network exploitation

1898
01:26:52,720 --> 01:26:54,550
or it's cyberspace
intelligence, surveillance,

1899
01:26:54,550 --> 01:26:55,500
and reconnaissance,

1900
01:26:55,610 --> 01:26:58,000
the ability to understand
what our adversaries are doing

1901
01:26:58,000 --> 01:27:01,260
are important things that we
have done for quite some time,

1902
01:27:01,260 --> 01:27:03,410
and one of the things I'd
offer that will provide

1903
01:27:03,410 --> 01:27:04,490
is that illumination

1904
01:27:04,490 --> 01:27:07,246
to ensure that we don't
lose the imagination

1905
01:27:07,246 --> 01:27:10,473
of what 11th of September,
the future may look like.

1906
01:27:11,208 --> 01:27:12,287
- Thank you.

1907
01:27:12,480 --> 01:27:15,140
The next question is really
directed at the Army,

1908
01:27:15,140 --> 01:27:17,900
so I will take a shot at it
and then throw a lifeline

1909
01:27:17,900 --> 01:27:20,573
to my Army partners, or
anybody else on the panel.

1910
01:27:20,940 --> 01:27:22,691
The question is, how can the JROC,

1911
01:27:22,691 --> 01:27:24,420
AROC, PPBS processes

1912
01:27:24,670 --> 01:27:27,098
sustain a culture of persistent innovation

1913
01:27:27,098 --> 01:27:30,083
against our adversaries
at the speed of relevance?

1914
01:27:30,692 --> 01:27:32,603
If you were across the hall

1915
01:27:32,603 --> 01:27:35,253
in the Army futures command discussion,

1916
01:27:35,530 --> 01:27:37,780
they would probably tell
you that those processes

1917
01:27:37,780 --> 01:27:39,493
have not been all that effective.

1918
01:27:39,850 --> 01:27:41,470
And if you look at what we've
been doing the last 17 years

1919
01:27:41,470 --> 01:27:43,293
and what the panel talked about,

1920
01:27:43,590 --> 01:27:45,940
the reason why we stood up future command

1921
01:27:45,940 --> 01:27:47,920
was so that we could get
ahead of these processes

1922
01:27:47,920 --> 01:27:50,733
and be quicker, faster, and more relevant.

1923
01:27:50,790 --> 01:27:52,483
And I think General Murray,

1924
01:27:52,720 --> 01:27:56,050
the Commander of Futures
Command down in Austin, Texas

1925
01:27:56,050 --> 01:27:56,950
is gonna take this on,

1926
01:27:56,950 --> 01:28:00,303
and I believe that our processes
in the Army will change.

1927
01:28:00,770 --> 01:28:04,003
How those changes will take
effect remains to be seen,

1928
01:28:04,240 --> 01:28:06,720
but the goal of this with
our secretary and our chief

1929
01:28:06,720 --> 01:28:08,288
is to go much much faster

1930
01:28:08,288 --> 01:28:10,700
to develop the kinds of
capabilities that we need

1931
01:28:10,700 --> 01:28:11,533
in the future.

1932
01:28:11,533 --> 01:28:13,080
If anybody has anything to add on that,

1933
01:28:13,080 --> 01:28:14,180
I would appreciate it.

1934
01:28:14,427 --> 01:28:17,890
- Years ago when General
Schumacher was the Chief of Staff

1935
01:28:17,890 --> 01:28:19,963
of the Army, so many of you always heard,

1936
01:28:20,030 --> 01:28:21,963
think creatively outside the box.

1937
01:28:22,490 --> 01:28:24,780
General Schumacher had an
interesting turn of that phrase,

1938
01:28:24,780 --> 01:28:27,523
which was to think
creatively inside the box.

1939
01:28:27,910 --> 01:28:29,117
So when I think about the JROC

1940
01:28:29,117 --> 01:28:31,093
and that entire process,

1941
01:28:31,980 --> 01:28:32,813
think about the people

1942
01:28:32,813 --> 01:28:34,900
that are successful at making that work.

1943
01:28:34,900 --> 01:28:37,913
Those are the ones that have
actually mastered that process.

1944
01:28:38,170 --> 01:28:40,220
So the more that you
understand how that operates,

1945
01:28:40,220 --> 01:28:42,340
the more you can operate inside that box

1946
01:28:42,340 --> 01:28:44,313
with certain degree of speed.

1947
01:28:44,605 --> 01:28:46,070
So when you go back and say, well,

1948
01:28:46,070 --> 01:28:47,650
we need the 5,000 series all changed,

1949
01:28:47,650 --> 01:28:48,940
I don't know if it's necessarily that

1950
01:28:48,940 --> 01:28:51,944
as much as it is allowing
us to educate ourselves

1951
01:28:51,944 --> 01:28:54,340
and make sure we understand,
I know what the rules are

1952
01:28:54,340 --> 01:28:56,260
and I can actually work
with a degree of speed

1953
01:28:56,260 --> 01:28:57,573
inside those rules.

1954
01:28:57,820 --> 01:28:59,855
The other thing is a
bit of a culture change

1955
01:28:59,855 --> 01:29:04,855
within probably DOD, at least
from my time on the Army G2,

1956
01:29:05,647 --> 01:29:09,401
and I think this comes with
the advent of what we've had

1957
01:29:09,401 --> 01:29:13,620
resonate from our overseers in congress,

1958
01:29:13,620 --> 01:29:16,320
which is, don't feel like
you gotta build it yourself.

1959
01:29:16,860 --> 01:29:18,460
'cause industry is ahead of you,

1960
01:29:19,140 --> 01:29:23,516
they probably have an 80%
solution, and to embrace that

1961
01:29:23,516 --> 01:29:25,800
and understand that we
can probably figure out

1962
01:29:25,800 --> 01:29:28,600
what's the last 20%, and
that's gonna solve our problem.

1963
01:29:28,830 --> 01:29:31,010
So, in many ways, instead
of going back under the lab

1964
01:29:31,010 --> 01:29:33,660
and thinking that we've
gotta build this fro scratch,

1965
01:29:34,010 --> 01:29:37,670
we just have to be aggressive
with industry, entice them

1966
01:29:37,670 --> 01:29:40,370
to be interested in the
problem we're trying to solve,

1967
01:29:40,510 --> 01:29:42,217
and chances are you're gonna
find about an 80% solution

1968
01:29:42,217 --> 01:29:44,137
and then you gotta work on that last 20%,

1969
01:29:44,137 --> 01:29:46,363
and I think it's gonna
get you there quicker.

1970
01:29:47,054 --> 01:29:50,101
- So I think persistent innovation for me

1971
01:29:50,101 --> 01:29:53,197
is working with a series
of different partners.

1972
01:29:53,197 --> 01:29:55,625
What we have found very very effective

1973
01:29:55,625 --> 01:29:57,860
at places like the
National Security Agency

1974
01:29:57,860 --> 01:29:59,283
and US Cyber Command is,

1975
01:29:59,680 --> 01:30:02,270
find the partnerships
that really present you

1976
01:30:02,270 --> 01:30:04,226
a number of different ideas

1977
01:30:04,226 --> 01:30:05,950
that you probably may not get

1978
01:30:05,950 --> 01:30:08,560
out of the processes that you
described, General Berrier.

1979
01:30:08,560 --> 01:30:10,210
And so, whether or not
it's been the artist

1980
01:30:10,210 --> 01:30:13,840
formerly known as DIUX, or
it's defense digital services,

1981
01:30:13,840 --> 01:30:16,460
or it's a number of initiatives we've had

1982
01:30:16,460 --> 01:30:18,994
with agencies like DARPA.

1983
01:30:18,994 --> 01:30:21,803
This has provided us great context

1984
01:30:21,803 --> 01:30:24,788
to speed our innovation cycle because,

1985
01:30:24,788 --> 01:30:28,890
as General Ashley mentioned,
all the great ideas

1986
01:30:28,890 --> 01:30:31,110
don't necessarily originate
within government,

1987
01:30:31,110 --> 01:30:33,370
and being able to
leverage those great ideas

1988
01:30:33,470 --> 01:30:35,120
is one of the things we're
always looking to do,

1989
01:30:35,120 --> 01:30:37,010
and I think that these
partnerships have been

1990
01:30:37,010 --> 01:30:38,360
very very effective for us.

1991
01:30:38,530 --> 01:30:40,333
- One thing I'd add to this is,

1992
01:30:40,484 --> 01:30:42,080
so one of the projects we have

1993
01:30:42,080 --> 01:30:45,180
is to reset the modern integrated database

1994
01:30:45,180 --> 01:30:47,352
for how we look at
foundational intelligence.

1995
01:30:47,352 --> 01:30:50,759
And so, for us, that's also
reaching out to our partners

1996
01:30:50,759 --> 01:30:54,143
because it may be it's
not just US industry,

1997
01:30:54,143 --> 01:30:57,990
it could be a partner nation
has solved that problem.

1998
01:30:57,990 --> 01:31:02,453
And so we've gotta cast a
net that's beyond the US.

1999
01:31:02,880 --> 01:31:03,713
- [Sue] So, Scotty,

2000
01:31:03,713 --> 01:31:05,230
I don't think I can
answer an Army question

2001
01:31:05,230 --> 01:31:08,117
being the daughter of
a naval officer, but--

2002
01:31:08,180 --> 01:31:09,630
- [Scotty] Take a stab at it.

2003
01:31:10,420 --> 01:31:13,720
- Just to add, I think
there are two elements

2004
01:31:15,870 --> 01:31:18,340
from the intelligence
community's perspective,

2005
01:31:18,340 --> 01:31:19,830
'cause we have some of
the same challenges.

2006
01:31:19,830 --> 01:31:22,130
Number one is clarity
about what you wanna do,

2007
01:31:24,100 --> 01:31:25,660
which is different from clarity

2008
01:31:25,660 --> 01:31:27,160
about the thing you wanna buy.

2009
01:31:27,888 --> 01:31:30,873
We talk to our partners all the time,

2010
01:31:31,806 --> 01:31:35,120
and whether those partners
are in the private sector

2011
01:31:35,120 --> 01:31:37,870
or whether those partners
are in the acquisition field.

2012
01:31:37,926 --> 01:31:41,090
If you are clear about what you want,

2013
01:31:41,090 --> 01:31:45,173
there's a route to achieve it legally,

2014
01:31:46,045 --> 01:31:48,143
and if you talk to our partners,

2015
01:31:48,200 --> 01:31:50,850
if you are open to different
ways of accomplishing it

2016
01:31:51,220 --> 01:31:52,983
you will find a way there.

2017
01:31:53,229 --> 01:31:54,507
So that's one.

2018
01:31:54,507 --> 01:31:57,320
And the second is, I really
do think we need to focus

2019
01:31:57,320 --> 01:31:59,973
on the notion of scalability
a bit more than we do.

2020
01:32:01,040 --> 01:32:05,313
We are spending a lot of
money on one-off ideas.

2021
01:32:05,799 --> 01:32:10,799
I love that, but we pursue
things that can be used locally

2022
01:32:12,900 --> 01:32:17,900
and we are investing in
things that will never scale.

2023
01:32:19,628 --> 01:32:21,860
And so, one of my challenges

2024
01:32:21,860 --> 01:32:23,360
would be to everyone who is thinking

2025
01:32:23,360 --> 01:32:26,090
about what you wanna do,
think about doing it at scale,

2026
01:32:26,090 --> 01:32:28,970
and we will actually get faster

2027
01:32:29,241 --> 01:32:32,010
because you'll be able to
change once you have it

2028
01:32:32,010 --> 01:32:35,293
much more than if you just have
a bunch of little solutions.

2029
01:32:36,058 --> 01:32:38,660
- [Scotty] I'd like to
follow up on that question

2030
01:32:38,660 --> 01:32:40,400
about persistent innovation,

2031
01:32:40,400 --> 01:32:42,190
and it's really a talent
management question.

2032
01:32:42,190 --> 01:32:43,940
We'll start with Director Cardillo.

2033
01:32:44,270 --> 01:32:46,420
What is your organization doing

2034
01:32:46,420 --> 01:32:48,030
to attract the kind of talent

2035
01:32:48,030 --> 01:32:53,030
that would drive towards
persistent innovation,

2036
01:32:53,270 --> 01:32:55,305
maybe some disruptive
thought in the organization

2037
01:32:55,305 --> 01:32:57,815
that brings about new
actions and activities

2038
01:32:57,815 --> 01:33:00,400
to help get us to the next step ahead?

2039
01:33:00,400 --> 01:33:01,233
- Sure.

2040
01:33:01,568 --> 01:33:05,320
It's probably our most
important area of emphasis,

2041
01:33:05,320 --> 01:33:06,153
quite frankly.

2042
01:33:06,153 --> 01:33:10,024
If we can't, not just refresh and retrain

2043
01:33:10,024 --> 01:33:13,150
and grow the team we have,

2044
01:33:13,150 --> 01:33:17,940
if we're not attracting the
brightest to come join the team,

2045
01:33:17,940 --> 01:33:22,940
then our future value
proposition grows dimmer.

2046
01:33:23,160 --> 01:33:27,220
I've been in this seat for four years now,

2047
01:33:27,220 --> 01:33:32,130
we've literally quadrupled
our intern program

2048
01:33:32,130 --> 01:33:35,704
in order to make sure that we're
at least availing ourselves

2049
01:33:35,704 --> 01:33:40,704
enough of those bright minds
across academic institutions.

2050
01:33:42,391 --> 01:33:44,823
Great return on that investment.

2051
01:33:45,070 --> 01:33:47,740
90% of the interns that we bring in

2052
01:33:47,823 --> 01:33:52,823
are offered full time employment,
90% of those that accept.

2053
01:33:52,950 --> 01:33:55,423
So it's a great feeder.

2054
01:33:55,423 --> 01:34:00,423
Beyond that, because I don't
have the uniform positions

2055
01:34:01,790 --> 01:34:02,833
that I used to have,

2056
01:34:03,060 --> 01:34:05,593
this was one of the
downsides of the 9/11 surge,

2057
01:34:07,005 --> 01:34:11,200
40% of my civilian workforce
has prior military experience.

2058
01:34:11,200 --> 01:34:15,067
So tapping that expertise

2059
01:34:15,067 --> 01:34:17,313
and experience is also very important.

2060
01:34:17,680 --> 01:34:19,143
And then I'll just say, too,

2061
01:34:19,827 --> 01:34:21,397
as much as we're emphasizing
STEM, and we are,

2062
01:34:21,397 --> 01:34:26,180
and data science, and we
have a chief data scientist

2063
01:34:26,242 --> 01:34:31,242
that we hired from San Francisco,
and he still lives there.

2064
01:34:33,840 --> 01:34:36,850
He's on the plane a lot,
but the reason he's there

2065
01:34:36,850 --> 01:34:39,060
is because he taps into a broader pool

2066
01:34:39,060 --> 01:34:41,890
that we now access through
him and his service.

2067
01:34:41,890 --> 01:34:44,423
So we're thinking, and
I would just say, too,

2068
01:34:44,639 --> 01:34:47,040
an area that we'd be interested in

2069
01:34:47,040 --> 01:34:52,040
is some maturation of
federal personnel systems

2070
01:34:53,750 --> 01:34:55,054
in which we could get better

2071
01:34:55,054 --> 01:34:57,290
at welcoming some of these teammates

2072
01:34:57,290 --> 01:34:58,503
to come in for mission.

2073
01:34:59,159 --> 01:35:02,710
New PhDs who might be heading
to the Googles and the Apples,

2074
01:35:02,710 --> 01:35:05,540
give them an opportunity
to help secure the nation

2075
01:35:05,540 --> 01:35:07,260
and our interest for a bit of time,

2076
01:35:07,260 --> 01:35:09,023
go to industry, and then come back.

2077
01:35:09,450 --> 01:35:11,340
And it's just too hard right now.

2078
01:35:11,340 --> 01:35:14,160
That's not an NGA issue,
that's a US government issue

2079
01:35:14,160 --> 01:35:15,450
that we all need to work through,

2080
01:35:15,450 --> 01:35:17,820
but we're working on all fronts

2081
01:35:17,820 --> 01:35:20,170
to make sure we're
refreshing that talent pool.

2082
01:35:21,360 --> 01:35:22,440
- [Scotty] Anyone else
wanna pile on there?

2083
01:35:22,440 --> 01:35:23,640
- Yeah, a couple things.

2084
01:35:24,350 --> 01:35:26,730
My predecessor Vince Stewart
started an innovation center

2085
01:35:26,730 --> 01:35:29,090
inside DA to look at some of the internal,

2086
01:35:29,090 --> 01:35:31,433
smaller-scale problems to solve.

2087
01:35:31,629 --> 01:35:34,750
Our chief information
officer has a pod concept

2088
01:35:34,750 --> 01:35:36,880
where they bring teams together
to look at solved problems

2089
01:35:36,880 --> 01:35:38,173
through the use of pods.

2090
01:35:38,930 --> 01:35:40,687
We do have interns that come in as well,

2091
01:35:40,687 --> 01:35:42,100
and we wanna cultivate that

2092
01:35:42,100 --> 01:35:44,603
as they come back to join the IC.

2093
01:35:44,677 --> 01:35:45,940
But the other thing that we looked at

2094
01:35:45,940 --> 01:35:47,350
on the STEM side of the house, also,

2095
01:35:47,350 --> 01:35:50,880
is the competitiveness
of commercial business

2096
01:35:50,880 --> 01:35:55,760
in terms of raising what
we can afford to target

2097
01:35:55,760 --> 01:35:59,190
some of the particular skillsets
to be able to have bonuses

2098
01:35:59,190 --> 01:36:01,310
and things along those
lines to bring on the board.

2099
01:36:01,310 --> 01:36:04,210
And the other is a
analytic data team concept

2100
01:36:04,210 --> 01:36:06,300
which we started this year is,

2101
01:36:06,300 --> 01:36:10,120
how do we couple traditional
analysts to data scientists,

2102
01:36:10,120 --> 01:36:13,690
engineers, people that kind of
work those kinds of problems

2103
01:36:13,690 --> 01:36:14,840
to bring them together.

2104
01:36:14,900 --> 01:36:16,500
Kind of the generation I grew up on

2105
01:36:16,500 --> 01:36:19,430
is you had the app that
was on your computer

2106
01:36:19,440 --> 01:36:22,770
and you did whatever you
bought when you bought the app,

2107
01:36:22,770 --> 01:36:24,430
and the idea between the ADT

2108
01:36:24,830 --> 01:36:27,360
is that you literally have
the data scientists there

2109
01:36:27,360 --> 01:36:30,180
with the analyst
manipulating the information

2110
01:36:30,180 --> 01:36:31,920
and writing the code, where, in fact,

2111
01:36:31,920 --> 01:36:35,653
that team in many ways becomes the app.

2112
01:36:36,969 --> 01:36:38,704
- So if I mentioned

2113
01:36:38,704 --> 01:36:41,984
that augmenting intelligence with machines

2114
01:36:41,984 --> 01:36:44,620
is one of the intelligence community's

2115
01:36:44,620 --> 01:36:48,760
and the department's preeminent challenges

2116
01:36:48,760 --> 01:36:50,173
and priority areas,

2117
01:36:50,299 --> 01:36:53,863
coupled with it is the right
trusted agile workforce.

2118
01:36:56,480 --> 01:36:58,240
We've talked about
security clearance reform

2119
01:36:58,240 --> 01:37:01,720
'cause that slows the intake of talent,

2120
01:37:01,720 --> 01:37:02,713
but I think one of the things

2121
01:37:02,713 --> 01:37:04,900
that we're gonna have
to really wrestle with

2122
01:37:04,900 --> 01:37:09,900
is what both Robert and Bob mentioned is,

2123
01:37:10,730 --> 01:37:13,290
I've had a career that spanned 38 years,

2124
01:37:13,290 --> 01:37:14,123
all inside the government,

2125
01:37:14,123 --> 01:37:15,790
and I don't think that's
the way it's gonna go

2126
01:37:15,790 --> 01:37:16,623
in the future.

2127
01:37:16,623 --> 01:37:20,300
Not only because that's
not who we're attracting,

2128
01:37:20,300 --> 01:37:23,066
but it also isn't the way
we wanna develop expertise

2129
01:37:23,066 --> 01:37:24,160
necessarily.

2130
01:37:24,160 --> 01:37:25,846
And so, how do we set up a system

2131
01:37:25,846 --> 01:37:29,817
that has Robert's people in school

2132
01:37:29,817 --> 01:37:32,190
that are getting a
clearance early so that,

2133
01:37:32,190 --> 01:37:34,260
when they're ready to come and join us,

2134
01:37:34,260 --> 01:37:36,363
they're right into the workforce?

2135
01:37:36,560 --> 01:37:39,210
I would say the best first five years

2136
01:37:39,210 --> 01:37:43,380
of any STEM student's career

2137
01:37:43,380 --> 01:37:45,280
would be spent with the US government.

2138
01:37:45,734 --> 01:37:48,120
I think this community
provides more opportunity,

2139
01:37:48,120 --> 01:37:50,770
more challenges for those first five years

2140
01:37:51,070 --> 01:37:52,810
than the Googles or the Amazons

2141
01:37:52,810 --> 01:37:56,020
or the anyone else can offer,
but at about five years

2142
01:37:56,020 --> 01:37:58,400
they're ready to keep
advancing their craft

2143
01:37:58,400 --> 01:38:02,180
and we tend to do more
toward the bureaucracy.

2144
01:38:02,180 --> 01:38:03,420
I say we need to find ways

2145
01:38:03,420 --> 01:38:06,130
to get them out of that
five years and come back.

2146
01:38:06,130 --> 01:38:07,790
So what we are going to have to do

2147
01:38:07,790 --> 01:38:09,830
is make it much more fluid,

2148
01:38:09,830 --> 01:38:11,840
but I think there are
opportunities for partnership,

2149
01:38:11,840 --> 01:38:16,840
because, in fact, I think the
collective needs each other,

2150
01:38:17,330 --> 01:38:20,197
and there is not enough if we
are competing with one another

2151
01:38:20,197 --> 01:38:24,150
and we need to think about
how we advance these skills

2152
01:38:24,150 --> 01:38:24,983
within us.

2153
01:38:24,983 --> 01:38:27,500
And I think that includes
our international partners

2154
01:38:27,860 --> 01:38:29,360
as well, and universities.

2155
01:38:29,360 --> 01:38:31,520
We just have to think more completely

2156
01:38:32,110 --> 01:38:34,760
about how we are going
to develop expertise

2157
01:38:34,760 --> 01:38:39,340
and make this very exciting
discipline of national security

2158
01:38:40,200 --> 01:38:42,670
more attractive, more
available for the talent

2159
01:38:42,670 --> 01:38:43,770
that's coming through.

2160
01:38:44,590 --> 01:38:46,903
- And, if I can just echo that too.

2161
01:38:46,934 --> 01:38:49,993
I don't want to lose sight
of what we can offer.

2162
01:38:50,810 --> 01:38:53,860
You have such talented
engineers, mathematicians,

2163
01:38:53,860 --> 01:38:57,233
economists, data scientists,
computer visualization folks.

2164
01:38:57,640 --> 01:39:01,350
They can go off and earn their
millions in Silicon Valley

2165
01:39:01,350 --> 01:39:03,250
and we can't compete with that salary.

2166
01:39:03,453 --> 01:39:06,920
But what we can do is provide challenging,

2167
01:39:06,920 --> 01:39:09,063
fun national security problems.

2168
01:39:09,282 --> 01:39:12,980
Getting into the classified
world also opens your eyes,

2169
01:39:12,980 --> 01:39:14,880
but I would hope that
we'd be tugging a bit

2170
01:39:14,880 --> 01:39:16,870
at their patriotic blood,

2171
01:39:16,870 --> 01:39:18,620
but we have some immense challenges

2172
01:39:18,920 --> 01:39:21,473
that we could definitely
use that talent for.

2173
01:39:22,370 --> 01:39:23,290
- [Scotty] Okay, we're gonna jump back

2174
01:39:23,290 --> 01:39:26,210
into some pretty interesting
threat spectrums here.

2175
01:39:26,210 --> 01:39:28,727
This one has to do with
unmanned aerial systems,

2176
01:39:28,727 --> 01:39:32,140
and the question is, after
the drone attack and explosion

2177
01:39:32,140 --> 01:39:34,000
in Venezuela, how real is the threat

2178
01:39:34,000 --> 01:39:36,913
of unmanned aerial systems
to US national security,

2179
01:39:37,550 --> 01:39:41,540
and what is the IC doing to
invest in counter UAS systems,

2180
01:39:41,540 --> 01:39:43,213
and I'll make that a jump ball.

2181
01:39:44,590 --> 01:39:45,423
- [Sue] Very.

2182
01:39:46,180 --> 01:39:47,013
- Serious.

2183
01:39:48,327 --> 01:39:49,473
- Concern.

2184
01:39:50,780 --> 01:39:51,863
- Strategery.

2185
01:39:52,015 --> 01:39:53,550
(laughter)

2186
01:39:53,550 --> 01:39:54,383
Nah, I'm sorry.

2187
01:39:55,470 --> 01:39:57,477
I've been wanting to do
that for like five panels.

2188
01:39:57,477 --> 01:39:59,899
- That was awesome.

2189
01:39:59,899 --> 01:40:02,100
- So I'll jump a little bit more.

2190
01:40:02,100 --> 01:40:03,153
Obviously concerned.

2191
01:40:03,512 --> 01:40:07,420
When you look at what's taken
place in the combat zones,

2192
01:40:07,420 --> 01:40:09,043
what took place in Venezuela,

2193
01:40:10,974 --> 01:40:13,350
what started gets back to
the imagination conversation.

2194
01:40:13,350 --> 01:40:17,523
What started off as a commercial
toy, a commercial toy.

2195
01:40:17,590 --> 01:40:20,163
So how do we discipline
ourselves to do that?

2196
01:40:20,690 --> 01:40:25,690
My son has a job as a graphic
engineer and videographer,

2197
01:40:26,124 --> 01:40:29,120
and one of the tasks he had was to film

2198
01:40:30,360 --> 01:40:32,073
the renovations to a golf course.

2199
01:40:32,588 --> 01:40:34,950
The good thing is it was a
level of discipline to do that.

2200
01:40:34,950 --> 01:40:37,570
He actually had to get
certified with the FAA

2201
01:40:38,320 --> 01:40:41,020
to fly that quad over the golf course

2202
01:40:41,030 --> 01:40:42,330
to be able to do all that.

2203
01:40:42,870 --> 01:40:45,603
So he's a good, law abiding citizen.

2204
01:40:46,380 --> 01:40:50,040
But from a domestic
standpoint, in law enforcement,

2205
01:40:50,040 --> 01:40:51,480
all kinds of aspects of that,

2206
01:40:51,480 --> 01:40:55,110
but it just gets into the
creativity of how you can imagine

2207
01:40:56,490 --> 01:40:59,373
what may seem the most
innocuous kind of technology.

2208
01:40:59,690 --> 01:41:02,680
And so there's a lot of
things from an R&D standpoint

2209
01:41:03,090 --> 01:41:04,860
which is probably better
fit for another panel

2210
01:41:04,860 --> 01:41:07,890
to look at how we counter UASs.

2211
01:41:07,890 --> 01:41:10,290
There's a lot of technology
that's been fielded,

2212
01:41:10,305 --> 01:41:13,661
and as we saw these kinds of
things come out, the good thing

2213
01:41:13,661 --> 01:41:16,950
was industry came out with
lots of different ideas,

2214
01:41:16,950 --> 01:41:19,010
and we started putting lots of
different things in the field

2215
01:41:19,010 --> 01:41:20,210
to see the best of breed

2216
01:41:20,520 --> 01:41:22,493
so we could embrace the best of breed,

2217
01:41:22,580 --> 01:41:23,780
and that's something that we're teaming

2218
01:41:23,780 --> 01:41:26,500
with some of our other partners as well,

2219
01:41:26,500 --> 01:41:27,680
and how we get that in their hands,

2220
01:41:27,680 --> 01:41:29,560
'cause they're gonna be vulnerable

2221
01:41:29,560 --> 01:41:31,743
to those kinds of attacks.

2222
01:41:32,000 --> 01:41:34,835
But the other part is, what's the next UAS

2223
01:41:34,835 --> 01:41:37,640
kind of device that is coming out?

2224
01:41:37,640 --> 01:41:38,473
- [Paul] Why aren't we concerned about it

2225
01:41:38,473 --> 01:41:42,523
being on the ground or in
the maritime or in space?

2226
01:41:42,615 --> 01:41:44,630
We focus right now on UASs,

2227
01:41:44,630 --> 01:41:47,954
but think of the impact it could have

2228
01:41:47,954 --> 01:41:50,483
in any of those other domains as well.

2229
01:41:51,660 --> 01:41:54,460
This is something that
is going to be central

2230
01:41:54,460 --> 01:41:55,580
to what we're going to be looking at

2231
01:41:55,580 --> 01:41:56,980
for many many years to come.

2232
01:41:57,470 --> 01:42:02,470
- And just picking up on that
point, in the digital domain.

2233
01:42:06,270 --> 01:42:11,270
If there were 300,000 drones,
UASs hovering over our head

2234
01:42:11,590 --> 01:42:14,723
doing nothing, we would take it seriously.

2235
01:42:15,126 --> 01:42:19,490
If you think about out
adversary's presence

2236
01:42:19,560 --> 01:42:23,630
in the digital domain, it's equivalent,

2237
01:42:23,630 --> 01:42:26,223
we just can't see it.

2238
01:42:26,850 --> 01:42:29,280
And so I think this is going
to be our great challenge,

2239
01:42:29,280 --> 01:42:31,420
and it's below the threshold threat.

2240
01:42:31,420 --> 01:42:32,663
When does it cross?

2241
01:42:33,130 --> 01:42:36,300
But the UASs, in addition
to the threat they posed

2242
01:42:36,300 --> 01:42:38,550
in Venezuela, they're just
adding to another layer

2243
01:42:38,550 --> 01:42:39,523
of transparency.

2244
01:42:40,020 --> 01:42:41,840
We were talking about the expansionism

2245
01:42:41,840 --> 01:42:45,273
of Russia and China in terms
of shared space worldwide.

2246
01:42:46,890 --> 01:42:50,880
Those sovereign pieces of
territory that were our bases

2247
01:42:50,880 --> 01:42:54,830
and installations are now
right next door to another

2248
01:42:55,550 --> 01:43:00,150
who would fly a toy over our compound

2249
01:43:00,150 --> 01:43:01,500
to be able to see what we're doing.

2250
01:43:01,500 --> 01:43:04,260
So I think the question is, in addition,

2251
01:43:04,260 --> 01:43:07,730
how are you gonna counter
it, how are you gonna exist

2252
01:43:07,730 --> 01:43:10,723
in a world where everything is seen?

2253
01:43:12,820 --> 01:43:15,520
- And then back to the
acquisition discussion earlier.

2254
01:43:16,070 --> 01:43:19,943
I can't wait for a year-long
AOA requirements documents,

2255
01:43:19,943 --> 01:43:23,445
R&D process, develop
test, operational test.

2256
01:43:23,445 --> 01:43:26,010
We gotta think in terms
of what can you get me.

2257
01:43:26,010 --> 01:43:27,640
It may only be the 70% solution,

2258
01:43:27,640 --> 01:43:29,160
but what can you get me next month?

2259
01:43:29,160 --> 01:43:31,160
What can you get me three
to six months down the road?

2260
01:43:31,160 --> 01:43:33,630
And then just do that agile,
iterative development process,

2261
01:43:33,630 --> 01:43:35,633
development fielding process.

2262
01:43:35,709 --> 01:43:38,100
- But we've already
seen how this has moved

2263
01:43:38,100 --> 01:43:40,923
into its next phase, swarming technology.

2264
01:43:41,103 --> 01:43:45,363
I'm able to shoot down one,
but what if it's hundreds,

2265
01:43:46,659 --> 01:43:50,210
and driven by AI to allows
each of them to operate

2266
01:43:50,210 --> 01:43:51,043
independently?

2267
01:43:51,550 --> 01:43:54,053
So the challenge is only
getting more complex.

2268
01:43:54,702 --> 01:43:57,290
- [Scotty] Okay, we've
got about 15 minutes left

2269
01:43:57,290 --> 01:43:59,820
and I've got one remaining question.

2270
01:43:59,820 --> 01:44:00,653
It's for the panel.

2271
01:44:00,653 --> 01:44:03,130
We're coming to a crescendo,
you can feel the swell here.

2272
01:44:03,130 --> 01:44:07,757
So here it is, and, Sue,
because you're closest to me,

2273
01:44:07,757 --> 01:44:08,590
we're gonna start with you.

2274
01:44:08,590 --> 01:44:09,423
- All right, I'm ready.

2275
01:44:09,423 --> 01:44:10,689
- [Scotty] What does the
operational threat environment

2276
01:44:10,689 --> 01:44:13,760
look like in 2030, and, in your view,

2277
01:44:13,760 --> 01:44:15,630
what must your agency or entity

2278
01:44:15,700 --> 01:44:18,550
in the intelligence community
do to protect the homeland,

2279
01:44:18,610 --> 01:44:20,413
secure US interest abroad,

2280
01:44:20,720 --> 01:44:23,590
and support our war fighters
in future conflicts?

2281
01:44:23,590 --> 01:44:25,390
- Well, 2030's about a minute away,

2282
01:44:25,390 --> 01:44:29,180
so I think we've spent the whole
afternoon talking about it.

2283
01:44:29,180 --> 01:44:34,180
I'd add two things that I,
one thing that we meant to.

2284
01:44:36,108 --> 01:44:39,313
One, bio technologies,

2285
01:44:39,319 --> 01:44:44,319
I think we are just beginning
to really understand

2286
01:44:47,420 --> 01:44:50,290
that technology and the
potential use of that

2287
01:44:50,290 --> 01:44:51,150
by our adversaries.

2288
01:44:51,150 --> 01:44:53,577
And I'm not just talking
about biological warfare

2289
01:44:53,577 --> 01:44:55,980
in the classic sense,
I'm just talking about

2290
01:44:55,980 --> 01:44:57,580
the manipulation of biologics,

2291
01:44:57,580 --> 01:45:02,580
and I think that is
increasingly available and

2292
01:45:07,470 --> 01:45:09,552
will test us in terms of our response

2293
01:45:09,552 --> 01:45:13,510
because of its difficulty in
terms of being able to see it.

2294
01:45:13,510 --> 01:45:15,893
And then the second is more generally.

2295
01:45:17,482 --> 01:45:20,020
We've been talking about
counter proliferation

2296
01:45:20,020 --> 01:45:24,163
for my whole lifetime,
or certainly since 1989.

2297
01:45:24,257 --> 01:45:27,800
I think you have to just imagine that,

2298
01:45:27,800 --> 01:45:30,883
with the use of chemical warfare,

2299
01:45:31,170 --> 01:45:34,160
with the spread of nuclear capability,

2300
01:45:34,160 --> 01:45:36,280
with the connectivity of the world,

2301
01:45:36,280 --> 01:45:40,873
that weapons of mass
destruction, proliferation,

2302
01:45:40,873 --> 01:45:44,830
different kinds of threats
than global thermonuclear war,

2303
01:45:44,830 --> 01:45:47,273
but that proliferation
will come back around.

2304
01:45:48,780 --> 01:45:50,370
What are we doing to prepare for it?

2305
01:45:50,370 --> 01:45:52,220
I think we've mentioned that as well.

2306
01:45:52,675 --> 01:45:57,675
Clarity, insight, left of action.

2307
01:45:58,760 --> 01:46:03,121
Ability to understand the
intentions, not just the actions,

2308
01:46:03,121 --> 01:46:08,121
of our adversaries, competitors,

2309
01:46:09,758 --> 01:46:13,000
to be able to see geopolitics differently

2310
01:46:13,000 --> 01:46:16,300
in a connected world, and the
economic drivers of activity,

2311
01:46:16,300 --> 01:46:20,317
to be able to understand
the bilateral relationships

2312
01:46:20,317 --> 01:46:23,223
that are not static,

2313
01:46:23,760 --> 01:46:27,623
because people's interests
align and then don't,

2314
01:46:28,019 --> 01:46:32,490
are all the elements of intelligence

2315
01:46:32,908 --> 01:46:37,660
in order to be able to inform,
as I say, our policy makers,

2316
01:46:37,660 --> 01:46:40,280
our war fighters, and our private sectors

2317
01:46:40,280 --> 01:46:42,170
so that we can make decisions

2318
01:46:43,900 --> 01:46:46,763
in order to act before we are forced to.

2319
01:46:47,606 --> 01:46:49,760
- So I would add three to that.

2320
01:46:49,760 --> 01:46:50,980
First of all, I believe that

2321
01:46:50,980 --> 01:46:52,760
our threats will be much more virtualized.

2322
01:46:52,760 --> 01:46:55,999
We talked about UASs, but
when I think about the threats

2323
01:46:55,999 --> 01:46:58,190
in terms of a virtualized threat,

2324
01:46:58,190 --> 01:47:00,548
I think of the bot armies of the future

2325
01:47:00,548 --> 01:47:03,110
that will have an impact in terms of

2326
01:47:03,340 --> 01:47:08,340
their ability to be a
player in this future space.

2327
01:47:09,070 --> 01:47:12,223
The second thing is it will
be increasingly about data,

2328
01:47:12,700 --> 01:47:13,770
more so than it is today.

2329
01:47:13,770 --> 01:47:16,090
How do we store the amounts
of data, how do we ensure

2330
01:47:16,090 --> 01:47:18,660
that we can get at the right
data, and most importantly,

2331
01:47:18,660 --> 01:47:20,193
how do we protect that data,

2332
01:47:20,410 --> 01:47:23,393
that data that is our lifeblood
to what we're going to do?

2333
01:47:23,750 --> 01:47:25,640
And then I will also say, by 2030,

2334
01:47:25,640 --> 01:47:27,740
our nation will have a quantum capability.

2335
01:47:28,100 --> 01:47:31,744
That quantum capability will
provide us really a leap ahead

2336
01:47:31,744 --> 01:47:34,760
in terms of what we'll be
able to to across our economy,

2337
01:47:34,760 --> 01:47:37,653
across our national security
and across our future.

2338
01:47:38,120 --> 01:47:40,230
How is our agency getting after that?

2339
01:47:40,230 --> 01:47:41,063
Really three ways.

2340
01:47:41,063 --> 01:47:43,603
First of all, our
priority focus on talent,

2341
01:47:43,603 --> 01:47:46,660
ensuring that we continue
to hire the best people

2342
01:47:46,910 --> 01:47:48,635
that are reflective of our society,

2343
01:47:48,635 --> 01:47:51,180
that can continue to
make those large leaps

2344
01:47:52,255 --> 01:47:55,180
in terms of what Deputy
Director Gordon talked about

2345
01:47:55,180 --> 01:47:57,810
in terms of solving
those toughest problems

2346
01:47:57,810 --> 01:47:59,060
that our nation takes on.

2347
01:47:59,220 --> 01:48:01,830
Secondly is the fact that
we are focusing increasingly

2348
01:48:01,830 --> 01:48:03,930
on different targets, targets

2349
01:48:03,930 --> 01:48:05,660
that have an existential
threat to our nation

2350
01:48:05,660 --> 01:48:06,800
that are obviously

2351
01:48:06,800 --> 01:48:11,238
in the nesting of our
great power competition

2352
01:48:11,238 --> 01:48:13,340
that our nation is ongoing today

2353
01:48:13,360 --> 01:48:16,067
and will be of great
concern to us in the future.

2354
01:48:16,067 --> 01:48:20,650
And the final thing is our
commitment to being first

2355
01:48:20,650 --> 01:48:22,203
with technology and innovation.

2356
01:48:22,450 --> 01:48:25,663
That's something that our agency
has done for 60-plus years,

2357
01:48:25,907 --> 01:48:29,020
and whether it's been in
places like Cabul or Baghdad,

2358
01:48:29,020 --> 01:48:31,140
or in places like the United States,

2359
01:48:31,140 --> 01:48:33,070
we will continue to be very very focused

2360
01:48:33,070 --> 01:48:34,670
on delivering that
technology and innovation

2361
01:48:34,670 --> 01:48:35,503
for the nations.

2362
01:48:36,450 --> 01:48:37,283
- [Scotty] Kari?

2363
01:48:37,643 --> 01:48:39,693
- Yeah, I'm gonna hit the
five that I started out with.

2364
01:48:40,090 --> 01:48:42,763
We need to move faster at
scale than the other guys,

2365
01:48:43,374 --> 01:48:45,090
concentrating our investments

2366
01:48:45,090 --> 01:48:47,863
in the resilient survivable
agile architectures,

2367
01:48:47,879 --> 01:48:50,213
being effective in contested environments,

2368
01:48:50,270 --> 01:48:53,663
placing some bets on some
game changing capabilities.

2369
01:48:53,860 --> 01:48:56,620
We need to modernize
those manual data rich

2370
01:48:57,240 --> 01:49:00,073
but labor intensive
processes to get faster.

2371
01:49:00,230 --> 01:49:02,040
We need to elevate our defense security.

2372
01:49:02,040 --> 01:49:03,950
This is not just an
administrative function

2373
01:49:03,950 --> 01:49:05,310
but as an actual mission function

2374
01:49:05,310 --> 01:49:08,837
looking holistically cradle
to grave at our technology

2375
01:49:08,837 --> 01:49:10,746
and our trusted workforce,

2376
01:49:10,746 --> 01:49:13,393
deepening our alliances
in our foreign partners,

2377
01:49:13,570 --> 01:49:15,820
and better integrating
across our enterprises

2378
01:49:15,820 --> 01:49:20,090
within defense and intelligence,
but also defense community,

2379
01:49:20,090 --> 01:49:22,390
intelligence community,
and with our partners.

2380
01:49:23,630 --> 01:49:24,960
- So I think we hit most of them already.

2381
01:49:24,960 --> 01:49:25,793
For us, it will be looking at

2382
01:49:25,793 --> 01:49:27,657
how do we sense the operation environment

2383
01:49:29,001 --> 01:49:31,113
so that we're not surprised.

2384
01:49:31,990 --> 01:49:34,230
Not surprised by the
moves of a nation state,

2385
01:49:34,230 --> 01:49:36,680
we're not surprised by the
emergence of a technology

2386
01:49:36,680 --> 01:49:38,163
that we did not anticipate,

2387
01:49:39,956 --> 01:49:42,906
and one of those emerging
disruptive kinds of technologies.

2388
01:49:43,810 --> 01:49:45,000
Going back to Miss Gordon's comment,

2389
01:49:45,000 --> 01:49:47,410
I think a lot of times
we get very automatically

2390
01:49:47,410 --> 01:49:48,673
focused on nukes.

2391
01:49:49,366 --> 01:49:51,180
Rightfully so in a lot of ways,

2392
01:49:51,180 --> 01:49:54,680
but you go back and think
about the threshold for use

2393
01:49:55,302 --> 01:49:58,070
and kind of what happens in the gray zone,

2394
01:49:58,070 --> 01:49:59,030
and what were some of those things.

2395
01:49:59,030 --> 01:50:00,270
What we saw in the Novichoks

2396
01:50:00,270 --> 01:50:01,820
with the use and the script-all

2397
01:50:02,700 --> 01:50:05,500
case of a nerve agent or other
kinds of biological agent.

2398
01:50:05,500 --> 01:50:09,093
So the threshold for nukes
I think is pretty high,

2399
01:50:09,379 --> 01:50:11,777
because somebody says, if you
look at the last 500 years

2400
01:50:11,777 --> 01:50:13,700
and talk about great power competition,

2401
01:50:13,700 --> 01:50:16,460
we've not really had it over the period

2402
01:50:16,460 --> 01:50:20,706
of the end of World War II,
and a lot of people say, well,

2403
01:50:20,706 --> 01:50:22,730
what came out of Bretton Woods

2404
01:50:22,730 --> 01:50:24,530
was the International Monetary Fund,

2405
01:50:24,630 --> 01:50:28,797
World Trade Organization,
The United Nations, NATO, and

2406
01:50:33,530 --> 01:50:38,113
nukes were held by more
than just the United States.

2407
01:50:39,440 --> 01:50:41,760
So it played out in
proxies in other locations,

2408
01:50:41,760 --> 01:50:42,610
in other ways.

2409
01:50:42,610 --> 01:50:44,233
So I think looking at the things

2410
01:50:44,233 --> 01:50:45,860
that are below the threshold of nukes

2411
01:50:45,860 --> 01:50:48,140
in terms of threats is something
we have to stay focused on

2412
01:50:48,140 --> 01:50:51,233
because the possibility
of them being used.

2413
01:50:52,340 --> 01:50:55,930
And we really gotta stay
focused on what has existed

2414
01:50:55,930 --> 01:50:57,590
since Bretton Woods at
the end of World War II,

2415
01:50:57,590 --> 01:50:59,520
which is the current rules-based order

2416
01:51:00,099 --> 01:51:03,893
that has allowed a lot of
nations to be prosperous.

2417
01:51:04,030 --> 01:51:06,770
And that is threatened
by a couple of nations

2418
01:51:06,770 --> 01:51:11,770
whose value system is very
inconsistent with our own

2419
01:51:11,934 --> 01:51:13,925
and like mind nations,

2420
01:51:13,925 --> 01:51:16,840
and so we gotta stay
ahead of how we ensure

2421
01:51:16,840 --> 01:51:18,410
that we illuminate that threat

2422
01:51:18,970 --> 01:51:21,164
or that risk to other partner nations

2423
01:51:21,164 --> 01:51:23,683
as they make decisions
on who they align with.

2424
01:51:25,990 --> 01:51:28,397
- So to take a little different tact

2425
01:51:28,397 --> 01:51:31,500
since you guys have covered
just about everything,

2426
01:51:31,500 --> 01:51:34,950
but I have to say, our track record here

2427
01:51:36,050 --> 01:51:40,053
of doing 12-year projections
of threats is not that good.

2428
01:51:41,803 --> 01:51:43,420
These were the four best answers

2429
01:51:43,420 --> 01:51:45,920
I've ever heard about 12-year projections.

2430
01:51:45,920 --> 01:51:47,470
I guess what I mean by that is,

2431
01:51:47,485 --> 01:51:50,323
you're right, we're
gonna do the best we can

2432
01:51:50,323 --> 01:51:54,423
to identify these emerging threats.

2433
01:51:54,497 --> 01:51:59,497
I am prepared to be not
100% correct in 2030,

2434
01:52:01,040 --> 01:52:03,752
and so I think Kari hit most of it.

2435
01:52:03,752 --> 01:52:07,498
We gotta be ready for the unexpected,

2436
01:52:07,498 --> 01:52:12,380
don't wanna be surprised,
but how quickly can we react,

2437
01:52:12,380 --> 01:52:16,383
how quickly can we reengage
and re partner and reimagine?

2438
01:52:16,890 --> 01:52:20,410
And so, to me, I think the
more we build that into our DNA

2439
01:52:20,410 --> 01:52:21,610
the better off we'll be.

2440
01:52:22,801 --> 01:52:26,293
- Like in a fantasy football draft,

2441
01:52:26,748 --> 01:52:30,708
when you pick first you
get to come back around

2442
01:52:30,708 --> 01:52:33,503
and pick again, 'cause a
lot of good players come.

2443
01:52:33,720 --> 01:52:36,408
I'm gonna come back to
what I wish I'd said.

2444
01:52:36,408 --> 01:52:38,703
I also think you have to press advantage.

2445
01:52:40,321 --> 01:52:43,560
Press advantage in space,
press advantage in talent,

2446
01:52:43,560 --> 01:52:47,513
press advantage in compute,
press advantage in imagination.

2447
01:52:47,893 --> 01:52:50,520
Press advantage in innovation,

2448
01:52:50,520 --> 01:52:53,470
press advantage in an open
society, press advantage

2449
01:52:53,470 --> 01:52:56,830
in the private sector that
is a great engine for intent,

2450
01:52:56,830 --> 01:53:00,450
press advantage in the US
government's willingness

2451
01:53:00,450 --> 01:53:03,380
to put money into R&D to do it.

2452
01:53:03,380 --> 01:53:05,990
I think if I look forward

2453
01:53:06,620 --> 01:53:10,030
to everything that everyone
has said, I think that

2454
01:53:13,120 --> 01:53:17,630
US intent to continue to advance

2455
01:53:18,780 --> 01:53:23,180
is equally important to assessing

2456
01:53:23,180 --> 01:53:26,600
and countering the intentions

2457
01:53:26,600 --> 01:53:28,320
and the actions of our adversaries,

2458
01:53:28,320 --> 01:53:33,030
and it's that great yin and
yang that has for so many years

2459
01:53:33,030 --> 01:53:35,217
given us a tremendous
home field advantage.

2460
01:53:35,217 --> 01:53:36,980
And so, I think that part of this

2461
01:53:36,980 --> 01:53:39,600
is also to continue our press

2462
01:53:40,200 --> 01:53:42,550
in the areas where we
know we've had advantage,

2463
01:53:42,960 --> 01:53:44,650
and that, too, as Robert says,

2464
01:53:44,650 --> 01:53:49,650
is an equal counterbalance
to the undoubted surprise

2465
01:53:49,693 --> 01:53:53,380
that we will feel of
something that we didn't see.

2466
01:53:53,895 --> 01:53:55,260
- It's the infamous quote
from Sir Michael Howard

2467
01:53:55,260 --> 01:53:58,110
of the nation that gets it the least wrong

2468
01:53:58,700 --> 01:54:00,583
is able to recover in the future.

2469
01:54:02,690 --> 01:54:04,040
- [Scotty] And on that note

2470
01:54:04,170 --> 01:54:06,970
I think we will close this panel out.

2471
01:54:06,970 --> 01:54:09,680
To our panel members I
just want to say thank you

2472
01:54:09,680 --> 01:54:10,867
on behalf of the secretary in the Army

2473
01:54:10,867 --> 01:54:12,680
and the Chief of Staff of
the Army, thanks so much

2474
01:54:12,680 --> 01:54:15,147
for taking time out of your
day to be here with us today.

2475
01:54:15,147 --> 01:54:18,180
And to AUSA, thanks for
allowing us to do this

2476
01:54:18,180 --> 01:54:20,390
and for hosting, and
everybody have a great day.

2477
01:54:20,390 --> 01:54:21,290
Thanks, everybody.

2478
01:54:21,735 --> 01:54:24,068
(applause)